Poroshenko’s Trade Partners: How Ukraine Funds Russia’s Aggression

Poroshenko’s Trade Partners: How Ukraine Funds Russia’s Aggression

The greed of officials in power has led to the third year of war with Russia, where we are funding the aggressor in the energy and banking sectors and even in the military-industrial complex.

Reported by the ANTI-COR portal citing media.

The scale of funding by Ukraine of the leadership of the ORDLO revealed during the Donbas trade blockade is only half the truth. In reality, the situation is much worse. Today the Ukrainian authorities directly finance the very force behind the puppet quasi-republics, whose weapons have killed 10 thousands of our citizens and wounded another 30 thousands, and about two million have become refugees—the Russian Federation.

In the third year of the war, strategically important spheres of life in the country are controlled by structures linked to Russian special services and the higher leadership of the Russian Federation. And the Ukrainian government does not block this process. On the contrary, dependence on the aggressor—energy, financial, industrial—deepens even further, threatening the country’s security.

“Today, Ukraine pays for its own war. And all talk of coal of the wrong grade, boilers of the wrong system, and money that doesn’t smell is an explanation for fools. Money smells—of the blood of our soldiers,” says one of the founders of the volunteer movement “Army-SOS,” Yuri Kasyanov.

In this situation, the height of cynicism is the demands of the country’s top leaders to European Union countries and the United States to preserve and strengthen trade sanctions against Russia.

“If someone’s tongue is returning to say that sanctions should be lifted, what else is needed to hold the aggressor accountable?” Petro Poroshenko stated after the massive shelling of Avdiivka.

But while demanding retention of sanctions from Europe and the United States, President Poroshenko closes his eyes to the profitable cooperation of Ukrainian companies with Russian commercial structures under the protection of the FSB and the Administration of the President of Russia.

Conscious citizens who understand the threat from Russia’s aggression realize the need to preserve sanctions. Western partners of Ukraine understand this as well. But Ukrainian official-businessmen have a slightly different view on the problem.

The war continues? It does. People die? They do. Is it possible to fund companies and structures directly connected with the aggressor’s army? No. Are EU and US sanctions against the Russian Federation necessary? They are. Accordingly, Ukraine must primarily adhere to sanctions policy. And it is here that our official awakens—or what about the money?

At this stage, it all comes down to sums that businessmen close to power absolutely do not want to lose under any circumstances. France may agree to multimillion-euro fines for refusing to supply Russia with military ships it ordered, even though the contract was signed before the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas.

Germany may take a hard position on trade with the Russian Federation. The United States can afford multimillion-dollar losses from declining trade relations with Putin. And we—cannot.

We cannot, or enterprises will stop, people will lose jobs, budget funds won’t come in, etc. and so on. Although the real reason is simple: greed, lack of principle, and close economic ties between Ukrainian officials-businessmen and their Russian counterparts. And the country’s leadership turns a blind eye.

Non-alternative energy

Quite enough has been said about the “indispensable” anthracite from Donbas. But despite indisputable evidence and economic calculations that buying Donbas anthracite funds ORDLO and Ukrainian oligarchs, the Groysman government stands by its position: trade with the occupied territories is mandatory.

However, behind talks about people’s fate and forecasts of freezing, electricity-less cities, there is clearly another motive—the losses for businessmen interested in trading with the fighters are too great.

According to various estimates, from 30 to 50% of Ukraine’s banking system is controlled by Russian capital.

According to rough calculations, Ahmetov, who is publicly called Poroshenko’s junior partner, will lose up to 30 million dollars per month due to the blockade of trade with ORDLO. Yet the wind will whistle in the pockets of high-ranking officials. And in such a situation, national interests become an abstract category that means nothing to them.

Moreover, the issue is not limited to the coal industry. One of the latest examples is the South Ukrainian NPP tender for assessing the technical condition and timing of reactor operation.

Now everything is leading to the possibility that the contract will be awarded to one company, nominally Czech but fully owned by Russia’s Gazprombank, which is subject to US sanctions. Its rival in the tender is another Czech firm, partly owned by the same Gazprombank.

In addition to funds from the contract going to the aggressor country and the bank directly under sanctions, the management of the NPP does not see anything wrong with allowing representatives of the warring country on a strategic facility.

Meanwhile, a bid from the Ukrainian institute named after Paton to perform these works was rejected. The official explanation from the plant’s director is—so what that they are Russians? The specialists are good, and the work must be done very responsibly.

“This is a very specialized area of work, so we cannot entrust it to, even if qualified, personnel who lack sufficient experience,” said the head of the nuclear plant, Volodymyr Lytshynenko.

Under such conditions, Russia’s plans to completely control Ukraine’s nuclear market, which is valued at hundreds of millions of dollars per year, do not look so unrealistic. War is war, but business is business.

Financial noose

Not better in the financial sector either. According to various estimates, from 30 to 50% of Ukraine’s banking system is controlled by Russian capital. And this is done through the head of the National Bank of Ukraine, Valeriya Hontaryova, who was strongly recommended for the post by Petro Poroshenko.

The same Hontaryova, who had, perhaps, close ties with representatives of the Russian banking system, deeply integrated into the Russian special services’ vertical. And today it is reliably unknown how deep this cooperation is and what its bounds are.

At least, as late as November 2016 this year, in the NBU building she held secret talks with the head of Russia’s External Economic Bank, Sergei Gorkov. He is the direct subordinate of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and a FSB officer.

When the meeting became known, several deputies asked what was discussed and what documents were signed.

Deputy Ihor Lutsenko even sent an official inquiry to Hontaryova to confirm or refute this information. And the answer was, to put it mildly, unexpected.

“Hontaryova confirmed that in November last year she spoke with leaders of the state Russian bank, “Vnesheconombank,” in the National Bank of Ukraine building. Regarding the results of the meeting and which documents were signed, Hontaryova refused to disclose in breach of the law,” Lutsenko shared the result of his inquiry.

Meanwhile, Hontaryova referred to banking secrecy. And in response to accusations that Russian capital in Ukraine’s banking system could at any moment undermine the country’s financial security, the head of the NBU stated: she has a special plan for this.

A Ukrainian citizen’s company successfully bypasses sanctions and supplies components and aircraft engines for the country’s military needs in its war against us.

However, that is not all. It turned out that strategic Ukrainian enterprises are serviced either by Russian banks or by their Ukrainian subsidiaries. Among such enterprises are Ukrenergo, Ukrzaliznytsia, Energoatom, and even Ukroboronprom.

“Despite the third year of war with Russian occupiers, more than 70 strategic state-owned enterprises continue to be serviced by these banks,” published by MP Vitaliy Kupriy. “We are talking about current accounts, credit lines, and collateral.”

If one day Russia freezes financial operations for not all seventy, but just several of the above Ukrainian corporations, then the war in Donbas, as Poroshenko once promised, would truly end in days. But not in Ukraine’s favor.

Support for the Russian defense industry

Despite all these facts, the height of cynicism is the close cooperation of Ukrainian companies with Russia in the defense and weapons sphere. Today the locomotive of such cooperation is the company “Motor Sich,” owned by MP Vyacheslav Boguslayev.

That same Boguslayev who is very friendly with Sergey Glazyev, a adviser to Putin. Russian media claim that this friendship helps the Ukrainian company still sell its products in the Russian market.

And this is the same Boguslayev who stood humbly at a solemn service at the Valam Monastery in the presence of Russian President Putin.

Moreover, this is the same Boguslayev who besides his duties as a member of parliament also serves on the national security and defense committee and has access to state secrets.

Today through subsidiary structures in Russia and Belarus his company successfully bypasses sanctions and supplies for the military needs of the country that is at war with us, components and aircraft engines, and also modifies and repairs them.

And Boguslaev cares little about the NSDC’s decision of September 16 2015, which prohibits cooperation with a number of Russian companies that produce, repair, and operate combat helicopters and aircraft, as well as dual-use aviation equipment.

Why, then, does the owner of “Motor Sich” feel so free? Because NSDC, by some strange coincidence, did not include the Russian company “Aviaremont-MS,” which is partially owned by Boguslaev, in the sanctions list. This loophole helps the deputy cooperate with the state’s enemy, whom he represents.

Meanwhile, pro-government MPs refuse to comment on this issue, and when UA1 asks who is behind all this and why neither NSDC nor SBU has taken an interest in the facts, MPs simply shrug and switch the discussion to the inadmissibility of the ORDLO blockade.

And only one of them privately, indirectly but lucratively replied: “Who is our NSDC head? Petro Poroshenko. And who appoints the leadership of the SBU? Petro Poroshenko. Now try to answer who benefits from this.”

Nevertheless, besides Boguslaev’s company, the close collaboration with Russians in the defense-industrial complex was also noted in Ukroboronprom. One of the latest scandals is the purchase by this consortium’s subsidiary “Ukrinmash” of two dozen Russian engines for Ukrainian BTRs through Moldovan intermediaries for 300 thousand dollars.

Besides the moral aspect of this deal, there is also a real corruption: according to rough estimates, the Ukrainian branch overpaid by about a third of their cost for the Russian engines.

Notably, one of the intermediary firms through which this deal was funneled leads to Alexander Dubovoy’s circle, a longtime associate of Serhiy Pashynskyi. Pashynskyi himself until recently chaired Ukroboronprom’s Supervisory Board and remains head of the Parliament’s committee on national security and defense.

As the saying goes, with such friends Ukraine does not need enemies. They will do everything themselves and earn handsomely. And, unfortunately, while in the confrontation the slogan is “national interests – superprofit,” the score is 1:0. Not in favor of national interests.