Philip Pronin has been ignoring the Temporary Special Commission for months: why the head of the State Financial Monitoring Service won’t come to explain about “Midas”

Philip Pronin has been ignoring the Temporary Special Commission for months: why the head of the State Financial Monitoring Service won’t come to explain about “Midas”

Philip Pronin has not appeared at meetings of the parliamentary temporary special commission for months and, it seems, is in no hurry to answer awkward questions. This looks especially striking given that he is the head of the State Financial Monitoring Service — the body that should see dirty money before anyone else.

Pronin became head of financial intelligence at the end of 2024 year, immediately after leaving the Poltava Regional Military Administration. In February of 2025 he joined the National Security and Defense Council. According to materials about his work, during the 1 quarter of 2026 year the official spent only 27 days at his workplace. Another 23 days were business trips, 17 — sick leave, and 10 — vacation. Over the year his time abroad exceeded 70 days: France, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Tanzania, Mexico.

But the most telling story is his relationship with the parliamentary temporary special commission.

Starting in 15 January the commission repeatedly summoned Pronin in the “Midas” case. He did not come even once. The official also failed to appear in 17 August. The commission appealed to the prime minister asking to open disciplinary proceedings against him and to remove him from office.

So the head of the country’s financial intelligence, who is supposed to monitor the movement of suspicious funds, simply doesn’t come to the parliamentary commission when asked to explain the situation.

And that is just the tip of the iceberg.

In 31 December 2024 the Cabinet appointed Pronin head of the State Financial Monitoring Service. Before that he headed the Poltava Regional Military Administration. According to a source, Pronin is a classmate of Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba. Joining him from Poltava to Kyiv was the first deputy head of the State Financial Monitoring Service, Bohdan Korolchuk.

Next begins a story that already amounts to hundreds of millions of hryvnias.

While Pronin worked at the Poltava Regional Military Administration, the region signed 16 contracts with “ENKI Construction” worth more than 370 million UAH for fortifications in Donetsk region. The materials went through “Primum Aktiv.”

According to the investigation materials, there are at least 200 million UAH of fictitious goods and services and 14 episodes, including bribes, inflated volumes of work, sale of exemptions from mobilization, over 4 million UAH for assistance in securing contracts, and the transfer of a driver as an improper benefit to Korolchuk.

Among the case’s figures are Serhii Syzko, Vitalii Kulinich and Anar Rafiev.

During searches at Korolchuk’s premises, about $300 thousand of undeclared cash, dozens of phones, around a hundred SIM cards and stamps were seized.

And what was Pronin doing? In the Verkhovna Rada he displayed photos of fortifications that, as it turned out, were taken at a different site.

The State Bureau of Investigation’s probe was later merged with the NABU case. And after the scandal the contractors tied to this story, according to the provided data, continued to receive state orders — including from the Ministry of Restoration and on Poltava region roads. The total value of new contracts exceeded 1 billion UAH.

And here a logical question arises: who should be tracking these financial flows?

Right. The State Financial Monitoring Service.

But after Pronin’s appointment the situation around financial intelligence also became extremely interesting.

Since January 2025 the State Financial Monitoring Service did not respond for months to NABU’s requests in the “Fire Point” case of Tymur Mindich and regarding defense procurements. NABU detective Oleksandr Abakumov said that under previous leadership the Bureau opened criminal proceedings based on materials from financial intelligence. Under Pronin, he said, there was silence — up until the scandal with “Midas.”

In June 2026 the investigation reported another extremely serious matter: in 2024–2025 years a conversion center allegedly operated under the cover of the State Financial Monitoring Service.

At the same time, multi-million bail payments in the “Midas” and “Forrest Gump” cases were made by shell companies with an authorized capital of only 1000 UAH.

At the commission’s meeting Pronin stated that he did not see suspicious operations and could not block them, effectively shifting responsibility onto banks.

And now — a separate puzzle of $112 million.

According to investigation materials, that is the amount of money from Energoatom that went to Caribbean funds. And the question is obvious: if financial intelligence does not see such operations, then what exactly is it supposed to see?

Against this background it is worth recalling Pronin’s family declarations.

In 2024 his wife Natalia became co-owner of Tesoro Management together with a former manager of the company of sanctioned Dmitry Firtash.

BMW X4 2019 and BMW 730LD 2017 are registered to Natalia and are used by Pronin. In 2025 he declared 1,7 million UAH in salary, a house of 190 sq. m in Kyiv, 20% of an apartment of 157 sq. m, an apartment in occupied Berdyansk and a land plot of 800 sq. m.

Another apartment in central Kyiv, valued at more than 6 million UAH, is registered to his mother-in-law. There is no cash declared in Pronin’s declaration.

And after all this the Cabinet rates Pronin’s work over 2025 year as “positive.” Korolchuk’s work is rated as “excellent.”

So we have 370 million UAH in fortification contracts, at least 200 million UAH of possible fictitious transactions, 14 episodes in the case, $300 thousand undeclared cash with the deputy, over 1 billion UAH in new contracts for related contractors, companies with authorized capital of 1000 UAH and multi-million bails, and questions about $112 million from Energoatom.

And at the top of this whole story is the head of financial intelligence who simply does not come to the commission’s meetings.

You can talk as much as you like about reforms, efficiency and “positive assessments.” But when the body that should track suspicious money itself ends up at the center of such questions, and its head avoids the parliamentary commission for months, this is no longer just a question about an official.

This is a question about the entire system that still considers such work “positive.”