Some were dismissed on the eve of the holidays, others lost amid selection procedures: how the authorities are renewing the NCPFR before its transfer under Cabinet control

In 2024 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Law No. ¹ 3585 on the reform of the National Commission on Securities and Stock Market. Most of its provisions, for example those on reorganizing the Commission’s apparatus into the Commission’s office so that employees would cease to be civil servants, expanded powers and guarantees of the Regulator’s independence, took effect then, in 2024. By the way, the Commission’s membership was increased from 7 to 8 people.

But the entry into force of the rules on competitive selection of the chair and members of the Commission, as well as the guarantees for these officials against unjustified dismissal, was postponed until 1 January 2026.

This allowed the President of Ukraine 31 December 2025, at the end of the working day, to dismiss the head of the NCPFR Ruslan Mahomedov and, a few hours later—“as a Christmas present”—to appoint the unknown Oleksii Semeniuk to that post. Who, of course, did not go through any selection process.

Then, in the new head’s first days in office, the President dismissed two members of the NCPFR—Yaroslav Shlyakhov and Yurii Boiko—at their requests, which, as Ekonomichna Pravda reported, they had submitted back in early September.

So literally in the first working week of 2026 the NCPFR found itself in a minimally functioning state—the Law of Ukraine “On State Regulation of Capital Markets and Organized Commodity Markets” (the state regulation law) stipulates that five must be present at an NCPFR meeting, and five votes are required to adopt a decision. The Commission has been operating with that composition up to now, weekly reporting dozens of adopted regulatory decisions. In short, they’ve been figuring things out with five people.

There were three obvious vacancies for Commission members and one not-so-obvious one—the six-year term of NCPFR member Maksym Libanov, appointed in 2018, expired in 2024. Likewise, under the state regulation law, he continues to carry out his duties until dismissal under paragraph 1 of part nine of article 6-1 of the Law and/or until appointment of a new Commission member in the manner established by that law.

So, not rushing much with the competition (which, under the state regulation law, lasts up to 75 days), the President of Ukraine by his Decree No. ¹ 443/2026 of 27 May this year formed the relevant selection commission, which, a little over two months later, announced the competition for three positions starting on 1 August.

No selection was announced for the seat of Maksym Libanov, who is “sitting out” while awaiting someone to replace him. At the same time, that same Maksym Libanov also applied for the vacant position. And if his result is positive, circumstances could be such that there will be an NCPFR member Maksym Libanov, appointed in 2018, who is awaiting someone to be appointed to his seat, and an NCPFR member Maksym Libanov appointed by competition to the vacant position. Or, if he unexpectedly fails the competition, he will still have a legal basis to remain a Commission member until the end of times (that is, until a competition for that position is announced).

It would be good to ask—and hear from—the Office of the President and the selection commission why no selection was announced for the fourth vacant position. Considering that the need for it has existed the longest—more than two and a half years. No explanation for this decision has been given since the start of the competition.

Let us hope that the selection commission will advise the President to dismiss Mr. Libanov from his well-sat-out seat.

In addition, other interesting circumstances arose during the selection process: the IMF memorandum provides that amendments to the state regulation law will be introduced by the end of the year, according to which “the governance structure will comply with the Constitution regarding the government’s responsibilities for regulatory bodies.”

In diplomatic translation, this means “the NCPFR must become an executive authority (central executive body), not an institution within the presidential vertical.” By signing this document, the President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine and the Minister of Finance of Ukraine personally indicated that the corresponding presidential powers to appoint members of the NCPFR are unconstitutional.

But that’s an open secret; the interesting part is different.

To fulfill that obligation, the NCPFR prepared, and the government submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law amending the Law of Ukraine “On State Regulation of Capital Markets and Organized Commodity Markets” to improve the functioning of the National Commission on Securities and Stock Market (number, registration date: 16067 of 14.09.2026).

If adopted, the state regulation law will state that “the Commission is a central executive authority with a special status, established under the law by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” and “the Commission as a collegial body is formed of a chair and four members of the Commission.”

Thus the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will have to establish the NCPFR with five people. At the same time, if the President of Ukraine appoints three NCPFR members based on the competition results, their number would instantaneously become seven (or eight, if Maksym Libanov remains in his “old” status).

Whether the same chair and members will remain in the NCPFR or the CMU will select completely new ones, what will happen to the Commission’s employees, and how the transformation of a state collegial body with an unclear status into a central executive authority with a special status will take place—the government’s draft law gives no answers to any of these questions.

Just as Parliament is unlikely to answer why, two years ago, it was necessary to add +1 to the NCPFR only to make it -3 two years later.

We will have to wait for the competition results from the President, and then decisive reforms from the government. The main thing is not to mix them up.