Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Six ships per day instead of 16: Sulina’s “bottleneck” or a scheme with signs of corruption? 8 September, Member of Parliament Hanna Skorohod publicly alleged on her Telegram channel so-called “rates on the Danube” for seafarers and suggested that the head of the Shipping Administration, Serhii Hurskyi, might be connected to them. The next day the government opened disciplinary proceedings against the official and suspended him. Over three weeks the story grew with loud exposés, denials and even a version about a coordinated “campaign against the regulator.”
The StopKor team decided to sort out what is known about the situation on the Danube, what threat it poses to Ukrainian exports, what “Muza” has to do with it, and which questions the state has still not answered.
Why this matters for the Ukrainian economy?
The Danube ports Izmail, Reni and Ust-Dunaisk are the so-called “spare gates” for Ukrainian exports when the Black Sea route comes under heavy attack. In 2025, according to RAIL.insider, they handled over 8,9 million tonnes of cargo. And in the summer of 2026, as the Bessarabia Inform portal writes, record shallowing of the Danube already raised freight costs on the route to Constanța by 3–7 dollars per tonne.
All this is under constant fire: according to government data cited by Agropolit, since the beginning of the invasion 1173 port infrastructure facilities and 274 civilian vessels have been damaged or partly destroyed. If the unofficial “rates” that Hanna Skorohod writes about do exist, they would be built into the price of Ukrainian grain. If the information she voiced is not confirmed — unfounded accusations could damage shipowners’ and insurers’ trust in the state.
In both cases, the public has the right to know the truth. The same applies to seafarers’ documents: tens of thousands of Ukrainians’ earnings on foreign fleets depend on them.
What the MP claims
As reported by the media outlet TSN, Skorohod publicly alleged supposed unofficial payments for ship priority on the Danube, which, according to her, under Hurskyi’s tenure rose to 30–50 thousand dollars per slot, and also alleged that seafarers’ certificates became more expensive by 3–5 thousand dollars. According to the MP, such a price increase may be explained because (quote) “Hurskyi needs to provide for his muza for Instagram.”
Separately she questioned Hurskyi’s official trips to Poland. The MP wrote that she has evidence in hand, but it was not made public.
What Hurskyi and the government respond
Serhii Hurskyi himself, in a video address published on the official channel of the Shipping Administration, categorically rejected the accusations and said that he personally asked to be suspended during the investigation.
“Let’s start with the main point: the Shipping Administration does not issue permits for cargo handling operations in seaports, and in no way regulates the entry of vessels to/from Ukrainian ports. That is the responsibility of other state bodies and business entities that are not subordinate to the Shipping Administration. The Shipping Administration does not manage their economic activity and does not set the procedure for their operations. If someone has concrete evidence of bribery demands — name the surname, the position, the enterprise, the date and place and submit the materials to law enforcement agencies. But do not ascribe to the Shipping Administration powers it does not have,” Hurskyi said.
He added that the information spread by Hanna Skorohod allegedly (quote) “does not correspond to the facts and creates a distorted view of the situation.”
Meanwhile, the Ministry for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport reported: the disciplinary proceedings against Hurskyi are being conducted by the Commission on the Senior Corps of Civil Service, results — by 23 October, the duties of the head of the Shipping Administration are performed by Serhii Maksymov, and the ministry has appealed to law enforcement. At the same time the ministry emphasized that the existence of proceedings is not a final finding of the official’s guilt.
Market argument: Sulina’s bottleneck
The main counterargument some market experts offer against Hanna Skorohod’s claims concerns the powers of the Shipping Administration.
As RBC-Ukraine writes, the Sulina channel is managed by the Romanian administration AFDJ, and the Ukrainian part of the lists is formed by AMPU with confirmations from ports and agents; throughput capacity is divided 40/40/20 among Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. Ukrport president Dmytro Barinov asserts that the Shipping Administration does not influence the queue, and the problem is purely physical: the channel allows about six ships per day, while the ports are ready to receive 16.
At the same time, as OBOZ.UA recalls, AMPU itself warned about offers to “speed up” passage through Sulina, which it considers fraudulent. However, the question remains: who exactly makes such offers and has anyone investigated them?
Seafarers’ documents: everyone admits problems
This topic is not new. In 2023 the NACP publicly warned against the return of corrupt practices in seafarers’ certification, and StopKor wrote about a possible paralysis of the certification system after the adoption of resolution No.1499.
The Seafarers’ Trade Union calls to refrain from declaring systemic corruption until checks are completed, but does not deny the problem, Agropolit reports.
In comments to RBC-Ukraine, crewing companies name queues in Warsaw as one of the main problems, and representatives of the NGO Together Against Corruption say a police certificate, which through intermediaries cost about 10 thousand hryvnias and which they say was canceled only in August, was an issue.
Are the “prices” voiced by Hanna Skorohod a new phenomenon or a remnant of the old system? Only competent authorities can answer after conducting checks.
Context that cannot be ignored
First, what is known about MP Hanna Skorohod herself? As RBC-Ukraine notes, in December 2025 the NABU and SAP notified her of suspicion in a case about alleged “sale” of NSDC sanctions for 250 thousand dollars, and in June 2026 the investigation was completed.
The MP denies guilt, and StopKor at the time covered the course of the High Anti-Corruption Court hearing.
Second, notably, three of the four key publications defending Hurskyi were released 25 September and, in essence, reproduce the same text: Agropolit directly refers to RBC-Ukraine, OBOZ.UA quotes fragments of that same article verbatim. RBC’s article calls the MP’s statements an “information mine” and hints that the conflict and destabilization of port operations coincide with possible interests of the Russian Federation. The article does not include a comment from Hanna Skorohod.
Third, the Danube direction has been a risk zone for years. StopKor in 2019 investigated the sell-off of the Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company’s fleet and the wealth of its then head Dmytro Chaly, and in 2020 the personnel decisions of the next management. However, UDP is not subordinate to the Shipping Administration, so mechanically transferring those problems onto Hurskyi is incorrect.
What’s next?
By 23 October the Commission on the Senior Corps of Civil Service must give the government a conclusion regarding the information voiced by Hanna Skorohod. In our view, it is important that it be published regardless of the result: if the MP’s assumptions are confirmed — there should be specific accountability, not just a personnel decision; if not — someone must answer for loud public accusations without evidence.
The StopKor editorial office prepared information requests
• To the Ministry for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport: what materials did Skorohod provide; to which law enforcement agencies and when did the ministry appeal; will the commission’s conclusion be published.
• To the National Agency of Civil Service (Commission on the Senior Corps of Civil Service): at what stage are the disciplinary proceedings against Serhii Hurskyi, has the complainant and witnesses been interviewed.
• To the Shipping Administration: the number, purpose and cost of Serhii Hurskyi’s foreign business trips since May 2026; changes in fees for seafarers’ documents in 2025–2026; how many appeals were received via “ChesnoBot” and with what result.
• To NABU: whether information has been entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations on the facts made public by the MP.
We are currently awaiting responses and the results of the investigation.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "”Муза”, Суліна і $5 тисяч за сертифікат моряка: що відомо про справу Гурського?". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: NARDEP 24.