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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
🔐 "Krystalbank" turned out to be a key link in the Done financial structure, through which hryvnia funding for Ukrainian companies was converted into foreign-currency payments in favor of Swiss Done Switzerland AG. The main set of questions arises: why did the bank carry out transactions that other financial institutions refused, how was relatedness of the participants checked, and how were the risks of transactions with a nonresident assessed.
Ukrainian financial entities provide hryvnia financing, after which the recipient company purchases foreign currency and transfers it to Done Switzerland AG in Switzerland. The banking channel for this part of the transactions is named in the materials as Krystalbank. It is through this bank that the critical segment of the chain runs between Ukrainian hryvnia and the funds sent to the foreign counterparty.
The question for Krystalbank is not the fact of making foreign-currency payments itself, but the nature of the entire structure. The materials allege that other banks refused to process certain transactions because of concerns about relatedness between resident and nonresident participants. Krystalbank, by contrast, serviced such transactions.
If this information is confirmed by bank documents, the question becomes what exact checks were performed prior to the payments and how the bank’s stance differed from the decisions of others.
Financial monitoring is particularly important. The bank must assess the nature of clients’ transactions, their economic substance, sources of funds, and the links among participants in settlements within the requirements of the law. In the provided materials, some complaints concern the organization of financial monitoring at Krystalbank.
At the same time, there is no public decision by the NBU or a court establishing the illegality of specific Done transactions through Krystalbank in the available document set.
In this structure, Krystalbank appears not as a secondary settlement intermediary but as the point through which the foreign-currency part of the described model passed. A Ukrainian importer receives hryvnia financing, buys currency, and then the funds are sent to the Swiss company. Without the banking channel, this transformation of cash flows on the Ukrainian side of the chain would be impossible.
However, the ultimate economic substance of some transactions remains unclear. Done Switzerland AG is registered in Switzerland and previously had a different name. The company may have been involved in trading equipment, cars, grain, metal and other goods, as well as financing deals, settlements, and providing guarantees. But the provided documents do not show the full volume of transactions that passed through Krystalbank within this line of business.
A separate question arises because of operations with USDT. Three tranches of USDT were contributed to the capital of the Swiss company — 504 376, 504 415 and 511 512 USDT. In total this is 1 520 303 USDT. After that, the company’s capital increased from 520 thousand to 1,75 million Swiss francs through the issuance of new shares. Who exactly contributed the cryptocurrency and who received the shares issued against these contributions is not disclosed in the available documents.
This is crucial for Krystalbank because the foreign-currency banking chain and transactions with the nonresident are not separate from the overall structure of funds movement. If Ukrainian companies received hryvnia financing, then bought currency and transferred it to the foreign counterparty, the bank should have seen the corresponding payment grounds, contracts, parties to the deals and the purpose of the funds. Those documents could show how real the declared business activity was and how its participants were checked. Another segment of the chain is related to imports and VAT input tax. The provided materials describe a situation in which supply of goods from a foreign company creates tax consequences for the Ukrainian importer, after which the goods are resold.
A separate version is put forward about further use of the VAT input tax in operations on the shadow market. However, without tax invoices, customs documents and the full movement of the goods, one cannot assert the existence of an illegal scheme. Through the Polish KOOPERANT EUROPEJSKI sp. z o.o. a reverse movement of goods is also described. The company purchased raw materials and construction equipment in Ukraine and exported them to Poland. The chain also features Globinex, Motoroz Parts Ukraine, Komodity, Hamptons Trade and TBS.
The links among these companies, the nature of the operations and their tax consequences require verification against primary documents. As a result, Krystalbank becomes the most sensitive point of the described structure.
A financial company can attract hryvnia funds, an importer can buy currency, a foreign entity can receive payment, and the commodity and tax parts of the operation can continue beyond the initial bank transfer. The bank, meanwhile, has information about the movement of money and the documents on the basis of which transactions are carried out. Key questions remain publicly unanswered: what was the total volume of Done Switzerland’s foreign-currency payments through Krystalbank, which Ukrainian companies were payers, what contracts underpinned the transfers, how was the link between participants checked, and what decisions did the bank’s financial monitoring make. Data on the further movement of funds after they reached Switzerland is also not disclosed.
Therefore the main question in this story is not simply that Krystalbank was among the banking counterparties. It is why this particular bank became the working channel for the described chain, how deeply the economic substance of the transactions was checked, and what grounds allowed the payments to be made in a situation when, according to the provided materials, other banks refused to service them. Answers to these questions can only be obtained from bank documents, financial monitoring materials, contracts and regulator data.
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