Volodymyr Fesenko on the most dangerous winter scenarios and how to avoid them

Ukrainians may again face a harsh winter with power and heat outages. Russia will again strike critical infrastructure to increase pressure on people and the authorities. The severity of this threat depends on how well the government has prepared the country for it and has incorporated the lessons of last winter. Journalist Korotko pro spoke with political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko about this.

The pity factor doesn't work with Trump

- Will Russia once again intensify its “winter terror” against Ukraine to force Kyiv to be more conciliatory in negotiations?

- Partly this does relate to the diplomatic track, but it should be clearly understood that negotiations are not Russia’s main goal. They are only the final stage. The Kremlin’s main objective is victory in the war, forcing Ukraine into full or partial capitulation. Unfortunately, the enemy now has an obvious advantage: ballistic missiles coupled with a critical shortage of anti-missile systems in our air defense. Putin has again fallen under the illusion of a military victory.

- How should Kyiv formulate its political and diplomatic requests to allies to protect against Russia’s “winter terror”?

- First and foremost, that means direct assistance to counter Russian missile terror, which we are already actively working on with our partners. The second most promising course of action is unconditional strengthening of our asymmetric strikes on Russian territory. Effective strikes on Russian infrastructure and energy systems could create serious problems for the Kremlin. But again, to carry out this strategy we need missiles. Drones alone cannot close the current technological gap. The key point is to understand that ordinary calls for negotiations will not yield any result. There must be real, tangible pressure on Russia.

- Does simple rhetoric like “we are cold and in the dark, save us” help, or does the West respond only to pragmatic arguments?

- Emotional appeals help little. Hoping that if we appeal to pity we will immediately receive everything we need tomorrow is an illusion. Emotional rhetoric by itself is not decisive; everything depends on specific nuances.

And it is extremely important to understand that the West is not monolithic. The United States is separate, Europe is separate, and even within Europe there is no full unity. Therefore, we need to work with each country individually, using specific and targeted arguments.

For example, regarding Americans, pity with Donald Trump does not work at all. He is not empathetic, and he is not moved by data or photos and videos of dead Ukrainian women and children. With him you have to speak the language of facts: if we do not help Ukraine now with anti-ballistic defenses, Russia will gain total superiority. And with such superiority the Kremlin will never agree to end the war.

With Europeans the logic is partially similar but has its own shades. Here the key factor is security: “You don’t want Ukraine to lose the war, do you? Because if it loses, the war will come directly to you.” Then reinforce that with concrete demands: we need missiles for Patriot, at least older modification missiles like PAC-2.

There won’t be a social explosion, but risks must be minimized

- What new meanings should the authorities communicate to society so that the winter period does not turn into a social explosion or apathy?

- There will be no social explosion, because protests will not solve the existing problem. If people dissatisfied with the lack of electricity or heat take to the streets to block roads, will that restore power to homes? Of course not. Most Ukrainians understand that well.

But there is no simple solution to this problem. The authorities need to think not about abstract slogans but about how to practically minimize risks in security and infrastructure.

Recently, GUR representative Vadym Skibitsky noted that Russia strikes Kyiv and other large cities because they host facilities of our defense-industrial complex. Therefore, production of Ukrainian ballistic missiles and other critical armaments must urgently be moved as far from the border as possible, out of large cities, underground if feasible, and, if possible, deployed abroad. This is a real way to preserve production.

Second, protect energy facilities through decentralization. We cannot fully abandon a centralized system; specialists must weigh in, since the backbone of our generation will still be nuclear power plants (NPPs).

Thus the vulnerability of networks and transformer substations remains critical. Heat generation deserves separate emphasis: as this winter showed, providing heat to cities remains our most painful problem and requires priority attention.

However, we must be realistic: even large-scale decentralization efforts will not eliminate all risks. Problems in winter will still occur. In particular, we must already seriously consider what to do about residents on Kyiv’s left bank, who critically and massively depend on large CHPs.

- Do the authorities fully understand these threats, or will responsibility again be shifted from the sick head to the healthy one?

- Here there is precisely no such certainty. Officials at all levels and branches of government must jointly seek and find answers to the challenges of Russia’s “winter terror.” And they must search not separately—Vitaliy Klychko on one side and the Office of the President on the other—but exclusively together.

This senseless internal political war between them during a full-scale invasion is simply shameful. We’ve already seen a similar situation with shelters: years of a large war have passed, yet the issue remains unresolved due to constant internal quarrels and passing responsibility. This practice must stop immediately. Authorities and ambitions have no weight when the survival of millions is at stake.

In addition, the government should actively attract funds from Western partners for these emergency infrastructure solutions. Here a very clear argument should be used related to increasing migration pressure on the EU: either Ukraine receives financial and technical resources now to protect cities, or this winter Europe will definitely face a new wave of Ukrainian refugees. This pragmatic security factor can at least partly force European leaders to act much faster.

The coming winter is a challenge for new Prime Minister Koretskyi

- So is there a real threat that mass lack of heat and light will provoke a new wave of emigration of Ukrainians?

- Those who wanted to leave have long since left. Not everyone can or will leave. But I think a certain increase in migration, if only temporary for the winter, is likely.

- Are there signs that the authorities have drawn necessary lessons from last winter, for example, are autonomous generators being purchased?

- Generators have been purchased systematically for a long time; this process has continued since the first difficult winter 2022 year. Everyone understood things clearly back then, so there will not be major problems directly related to the availability of generators.

However, another question arises: which generators and for which tasks are being used? So that elevators and pumps for high-rise buildings operate during blackouts. From what I know, work is underway, but full readiness for winter is not in place. Unfortunately, that is an obvious fact. During the tenure of former prime minister Yuliia Svyrydenko there were no serious shifts in preparing the country for winter. That is precisely why Serhii Koretskyi was appointed head of government. We will see how he handles this challenge.

After all, supplying the country with generators is the easiest part of the task. You have to look a step ahead: what to do if there is a shortage of gasoline and diesel fuel? Russia is now purposefully striking that infrastructure. If there is no fuel, how do you fill thousands of generators? That is a complex logistical chain. The same applies to reserves and replacement of high-voltage transformers.

The second critical challenge is gas storage accumulation for winter. By the way, Europe is already facing serious difficulties with this. Due to interruptions in Qatari gas supplies, the European market is experiencing a shortage, and EU countries are again forced to buy gas from Russia. I think we will similarly buy Russian gas via European reverse flows, because volumes of Norwegian, American, or Algerian fuel are objectively insufficient for everyone. However, storage must be filled as quickly as possible right now, while market prices have not yet jumped, because prices will certainly start rising closer to autumn.

The state must help business

- What are the biggest challenges right now?

- The greatest infrastructure risk for large cities, especially Kyiv, remains large CHPs (combined heat and power plants). Electricity can still be rerouted through networks or critical facilities powered by generators, but hundreds of thousands or even millions of city residents directly depend on centralized heat from CHPs. If these giants fail in winter, it will become a colossal humanitarian problem.

Separate plans and targeted solutions must be developed now for each specific challenge. As far as I understand, for Serhii Koretskyi this is task number one, and he is actively working on it.

At the same time, new accompanying problems arise. We are already seeing certain changes on store shelves, and this is only the beginning. While our society celebrates strikes on Russian hubs of “Wildberries,” the enemy is just as purposefully striking our large logistics hubs. Therefore, we critically need to rebuild the entire logistics of retail chains—for example, abandon huge centralized hubs and move to a distributed system of small, dispersed warehouses.

- What incentive laws and measures should be adopted for Ukrainian business?

- First, compensation and insurance for damage caused by hostilities and Russian strikes. This problem has existed since 2022–2023 years, but it was not as large-scale then. Now, as the enemy systematically destroys logistics hubs, strikes on warehouses have become an extremely painful point for the commercial sector. Insuring such risks is now the number one problem for preserving business.

Second, state assistance and regulatory decisions are needed to change logistics. The logistics model that used to work effectively, oriented toward huge centralized warehouse systems, now carries enormous danger. Business needs incentives to branch out and decentralize.

Also required is very close partnership between business and the state. In this context there is hope in Serhii Koretskyi. He has massive practical experience in overcoming crises, including the fuel crisis in 2022 year. He is a very serious, systematic person. In addition, energy vice prime minister Denys Shmyhal is also an extremely experienced manager. There is hope that the government team will be able to find the right solutions and at least successfully resolve a significant portion of these critical infrastructure problems.

The president will not make radical personnel changes in the middle of winter

- Might the authorities risk making unpopular political personnel decisions in the middle of winter?

- What exactly is meant by “unpopular decisions”? The appointment of Serhii Koretskyi instead of Yuliia Svyrydenko, who failed to manage preparations for winter, had its clear logic.

If President Volodymyr Zelenskyi understands that a person is currently needed and should not be touched, he will not make any replacements—especially in the middle of winter. So I do not see any serious problem regarding potential unpopular personnel changes during the heating season. Moreover, our infrastructure vertical currently lacks a single irreplaceable figure to whom society would attach all its hopes for getting through the winter.

- Serhii Koretskyi moved to the Cabinet but retained his influence at Naftogaz. Now they want to put Yuliia Svyrydenko at Naftogaz. And there is evidence that Energy Vice Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal seeks to strengthen his influence and place his people there. Is that so?

- Yes, it is quite possible that Svyrydenko will be appointed to head Naftogaz. She is a top-level manager, worked in government as prime minister, and knows all the internal nuances of the sector. Likewise, Vice Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal may seek to strengthen his influence in the oil and gas sector; that is typical backstage logic.

However, now all of this is absolutely untimely and not the most important issue. Both Yuliia Svyrydenko and Denys Shmyhal are experienced specialists in energy and public administration. Their main task today is not to compete with Prime Minister Koretskyi for spheres of influence but to unite the efforts of all branches of government, agencies, and state companies for one fundamental goal: minimize the consequences of Russia’s “winter terror” and protect the country.