More than Two Thousand Kyiv High-Rise Buildings Are in a Risk Zone. What That Means — Explained by the Deputy Minister of Recovery

The topic of preparing Kyiv for the new heating season and protecting critical facilities in the capital has for months not disappeared from the official communication channels of the President’s Office. The recent meeting of the National Security and Defense Council devoted to reports from regional leaders on the status of protection plan implementation confirms this. 5 August the NSDC approved a list of measures Kyiv must implement to strengthen the protection primarily of life-supporting facilities. The first review of Kyiv’s resilience plan took place in early March. At that time the central government rejected it — sending it back for revision.

One of the key indicators that the city authorities pledged in spring to achieve by year-end remains in progress. This concerns finding an additional 200 MW of distributed electrical generation by installing cogeneration units. According to Deputy Minister for Recovery, Infrastructure and Transport Kostyantyn Kovalchuk, as of 13 August, Kyiv achieved the ambitious target by 25%.

It is worth emphasizing: in April the national leadership deployed the State Agency for Recovery and Infrastructure Development to reinforce Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko’s team. The Recovery Agency did not arrive empty-handed — the government allocated 4 billion UAH from the reserve fund of the state budget for construction of shelters for the capital’s energy facilities and for backup heat supply in the area of one CHP.

“In 2026 the Recovery Agency began construction of energy protection at 26 facilities. During the same period, the Kyiv authorities on their own initiated construction of only one facility,” Deputy Minister Kovalchuk told Hlavkom, describing the situation.

Kostyantyn Kovalchuk has worked at the Ministry of Recovery since December 2024. In particular, he was involved in managing headquarters for aftermath relief in Kryvyi Rih (the city had massive heating problems for two winters due to enemy strikes on infrastructure; only in the winter of 2025 did residents receive stable heat in their homes), as well as in Kyiv. Kovalchuk coined the term “Resilience Plan,” which the authorities now use everywhere when discussing preparations for the heating season.

At the start of the interview, Hlavkom asks the deputy minister to explain in simple terms what these “resilience plans” are, for which national leaders often criticize local heads when they are not implemented.

“There is the classic preparation for the autumn-winter period,” Kostyantyn Kovalchuk begins to explain. “It is well known to utility services and heat, water supply and sewage enterprises. It’s the annual boiler replacements, repairs of heat networks, and so on. Considering the challenges Ukraine experienced in the winter of 2026 (I clearly remember how on 9 January 2026 there was the first massive shelling of Kyiv), we started developing an overlay to the usual lists of preparatory measures. In early February we understood that we needed to prepare differently for the coming cold season and its challenges. The idea of resilience plans crystallized into four directions to strengthen territories. The first is engineering protection of critical infrastructure facilities. The country moved to the next level of protection (anti-drone and higher). So the demand for installing gabions (wire structures filled with bulk materials) is already in the past and no longer meets the challenges of protecting critical infrastructure facilities.”

The second direction is implementing distributed electrical generation. It’s simple: if strategic facilities in a given region consume a certain number of megawatts, you need to accumulate that same amount via distributed generation in case of a blackout.

The third is backup power systems for key heat and water supply facilities. For example, these can be diesel generators at pumping stations.

And the fourth direction of the resilience plan is backup distributed heat generation. Instead of large CHPs or boiler houses we will install smaller boilers. That is, heat generation will be diversified and its risk of loss reduced.

I’ll add: at the Cabinet level the term “Resilience Plans” was standardized by Resolution No. 393 of 20 March 2026. However, the four directions listed are not dogma. It’s like a constructor: you can add communications, shelters, logistical resilience…”

At the National Security and Defense Council meeting on 3 March, the resilience plans of all regions and the city of Kyiv were reviewed. The coordination center approved them, which launched a large set of construction works.

Except for Kyiv’s resilience plan.

Yes, except for the capital. As I recall, Kyiv’s resilience plan did not find approval and it was returned to the local authorities for revision.

Assess the situation in the regions regarding readiness for the autumn-winter period amid full-scale war. Let’s immediately distinguish frontline and rear regions.

A coordination center operates under the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by the prime minister. To date there have been 13 meetings. The highest levels of government continuously monitor the implementation of resilience plans. Problematic issues are discussed; the head of government issues orders to simplify bureaucratic procedures, speed up works and secure further funding.

Monitoring the implementation of resilience plans is carried out for each of the four directions I mentioned. By the way, you aptly separated frontline and rear regions. Experience and practice show that frontline regions move faster than others. A lot of cogeneration equipment and block-modular boiler houses are being installed. Kharkiv, for example, has dozens of distributed heat boiler houses that last winter allowed the heating season to proceed without major disruptions.

Looking at engineering protection of critical infrastructure facilities, across Ukraine in spring 2026 began construction of 455 such shelters. By mid-August the readiness level, for example, in Sumy and Mykolaiv regions reached 51% each, and in Zaporizhzhia region — 50%. These are good indicators, given that construction began in April of this year.

I want to single out the activity of the Recovery Agency. It took on works at the largest and most complex infrastructure facilities, showing high completion percentages.

A few words about financing. In spring the government allocated 28 billion UAH from the reserve fund for the resilience plans. Currently 70% of these funds have been used. Also, when the Verkhovna Rada amended the state budget, it approved another 40 billion UAH. So far those funds have not been distributed among regions. A Cabinet resolution regulating this issue should be issued in the coming days. Thus we will have 68 billion UAH to implement resilience plans. Estimated need through year-end is up to 70 billion UAH.

Experience and practice show that frontline regions move faster than others.

What is the situation in rear regions with energy protection?

Among the leaders are, for example, Volyn, Ternopil, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr regions. On average, the readiness percentage is above 50. In Volyn it’s 57%. These are data as of 11 August. The situation changes daily; it’s dynamic. Objective monitoring is carried out by the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine.

“A risk zone remains in Kyiv”

5 August the NSDC finally approved the resilience plan for Ukraine’s capital. According to it, Kyiv authorities must commission 200 MW of distributed generation by year-end.

photo Kostyantyn Kovalchuk/Facebook

Let’s talk more specifically about the capital. 5 August the NSDC approved the resilience plan for Ukraine’s capital. How did the Kyiv authorities work on this before: were their actions chaotic or was there at least minimal planning for heating season preparation? For example, in a conversation with Hlavkom the head of the State Agency for Recovery and Infrastructure Development, Serhiy Sukhomlyn, assessed Kyiv’s readiness for winter at a worrying 6%.

As of March the Kyiv resilience plan apparently contained seven sections. In addition to the four core directions, for example, it also included energy efficiency.

It should be noted that on 5 August the National Security and Defense Council approved an updated resilience plan for Kyiv. The set of planned measures and the capital investment amounts were adjusted. In turn, the Kyiv City Council revised the plan returned in March at the end of June. That does not mean, however, that energy protection measures in the capital were not undertaken. On the contrary: in April–May the government allocated 4 billion UAH from the reserve fund. At the initiative of the Kyiv City State Administration, the Recovery Agency took on a significant volume of works to protect critical infrastructure facilities.

For comparison: in 2026 the Recovery Agency began building shelters at 26 facilities. The city authorities themselves initiated only one protection facility this year.

Kyiv is also implementing distributed electrical generation. They have a goal — to commission 200 MW of distributed generation by the end of this year. A large share of that figure consists of donor assistance. We’re talking about dozens of cogeneration units purchased with funds from international partners.

In addition, the Recovery Agency, using reserve fund money, began implementing the fourth direction of the resilience plan — backup distributed heat generation. Works are underway in the area of two Kyiv CHPs.

To be fully frank, a risk zone remains in Kyiv. That is, as of today the city does not have a ready technical solution for additionally covering 500–600 MW of distributed heat generation.

Can you say which district(s) of the capital this concerns?

It is not a specific district; it is a service area. More than two thousand apartment buildings are located there. The local authorities are now analyzing which boilers are most appropriate to install, what capacity they should be and where exactly they will be placed. The state, in turn, is ready to assist with funding once this technical solution is available.

Kyiv residents are also concerned about the protection level of the Bortnychi sewage treatment plant. Recently mentions of this critical facility have become more frequent in enemy social channels. What is being done here?

It is a wastewater treatment facility. To avoid playing into the enemy’s hands, I’ll put it this way: the facility is included in Kyiv’s resilience plan. Certain measures are being implemented there — both in terms of backup power sources and physical protection.

If you summarize, what percentage of Kyiv’s resilience plan was completed by mid-August?

For the tasks performed by the Recovery Agency, readiness is 50–60%. Of the 200 MW of distributed electrical generation declared by Kyiv, 50 MW have been commissioned so far. That is, one quarter of the plan.

Separately, the provision of backup power sources, according to the Kyiv City State Administration — i.e., generators — is at the level of 60%.

According to Hlavkom, former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov, an external advisor on infrastructure and community interaction, was actively involved in forming the capital’s resilience plan. Tell us more about the Ministry of Recovery’s cooperation with Mr. Kubrakov. What does it consist of?

Regarding Mr. Oleksandr, he indeed participated in working through resilience issues. He was very active. I saw him several times at joint meetings.

I know that Oleksandr Kubrakov, together with Kyiv, initiated a program to place independent backup power systems in apartment buildings and condominium associations. To simplify: we’re talking about large generators. In March the Cabinet issued a corresponding resolution providing for implementation of that pilot project.

The idea of President’s external advisor Oleksandr Kubrakov formed the basis for the government resolution on installing independent backup power systems in Kyiv.

photo: Oleksandr Kubrakov/Facebook

“Lviv overall is keeping to its work schedule”

Returning to the August NSDC meeting. At the meeting, in addition to heads of regional military administrations, the report of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi was heard. Does this mean that Lviv is falling behind the approved schedules? Tell us what Lviv’s authorities should urgently focus on to minimize consequences of possible massive enemy airstrikes?

At NSDC meetings there is an ongoing process of communication with regional and city leaders. I can’t say that hearing Lviv’s mayor’s report is a marker that local authorities are doing something wrong. According to monitoring data, Lviv overall is keeping to its work schedule.

Moreover, the state finances repairs and protection of communal property. Local authorities in turn contribute co-financing. The formula is: 80% to 20%. In frontline territories the state’s funding share is greater — up to 90%. The remaining ten percent is raised by local budgets.

As of 13 August, implementation of resilience plan measures in Ukraine, specifically in terms of engineering-physical protection (a total of 455 facilities), stands at 41,1%. I repeat: all these facilities were started in spring of this year.

For the second direction — implementation of distributed electrical generation — the plan is to commission 1,6 GW. I do not know the exact figure of how much has been completed so far. The Ministry of Energy is the curator here.

Regarding distributed heat generation, the overall plan is 2,5 GW. Overall, the regions have contracted equipment (including block-modular boiler houses) for 1,6 GW.

If there is no scheduled preparation and the system does not operate because of failures, then no resilience plan will save you.

And the last direction — backup power sources (primarily generators) for critical infrastructure facilities. The total need is set at 1,2 GW. According to plan implementation, we currently have 915 MW, which is 75%.

There are regions that are one hundred percent provisioned with generators. From the rear regions — Zakarpattia and Volyn. Frontline — Chernihiv region and Mykolaiv region.

An important remark. Resilience plans must be implemented in combination with the usual winter preparation measures such as boiler modernization or network replacement. Because if there is no scheduled preparation and the system does not operate because of failures, then no resilience plan will save you.

An interesting observation. During the previous heating season in Ukraine there was no major failure in the heat and water supply system, except for damage caused by Russian shelling. This shows that utilities and authorities overall approached the matter responsibly.

By the way, our resilience plans caught the interest of the Lithuanian ambassador to Ukraine, Inga Stanite-Tolochkene. We spoke with her about specific measures and analyzed them in detail. I understand that the Lithuanians are preparing for possible unpredictable challenges from Russia and are therefore modeling Ukrainian resilience plans for their territories. It’s possible we will soon hear that Ukraine is exporting the resilience plan product to other countries.

Vitaliy Taranenko, Hlavkom