Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Millions of rubles to the aggressor’s budget: how companies linked to Netpeak and Artem Borodatiuk operated for years and paid taxes in Russia
Journalists found that after the start of the full-scale war, entities connected to Ukrainian IT businessman Artem Borodatiuk and the Netpeak group continued to exist in Russia and paid taxes into the aggressor country’s budget.
Despite Netpeak Group’s public statement from 9 March 2022 declaring a complete cessation of work with clients from Russia and Belarus, Russian legal entities associated with the company continued to operate for a long time. One of them — the former LLC “Netpik” — was renamed after 24 February and was liquidated only in January 2023. During its years of operation it transferred more than 23 million rubles to the Russian budget. Another legal entity linked to the Ringostat service continued to pay taxes in 2022–2025. At the same time, according to BuiltWith, Ringostat is still used on almost every third site in its client base in Russia.
StopKor analysts examined open sources and analyzed official registry data. They uncovered a number of facts that may indicate an incomplete exit of Borodatiuk’s structures from the Russian market after 24 February 2022.
Netpeak Group is a group of more than 25 IT companies, founded and led as CEO by Artem Borodatiuk. According to LIGA.net, as of last year its clients included well-known Ukrainian and international businesses: monobank, Samsung, Uber, Peugeot and others.
Meanwhile, in July the Telegram channel of the detective bureau Absolution Leaks published a series of posts drawing attention to the history of Artem Borodatiuk’s business cooperation with Russian companies prior to 2022, and to the public image of the entrepreneur as a member of the presidential Business Support Council.
Notably, Artem Borodatiuk himself publicly confirms membership in the presidential Business Support Council and emphasizes that Netpeak Group’s cooperation with the state is pro bono — he said this in an interview with the Kyiv Post in April 2025. That removes questions about the mere fact of closeness to the authorities — it is public and not hidden.
But that does not remove a separate question, which is very important for society during a full-scale war: did the business structures linked to Borodatiuk truly sever ties with the market of the aggressor country as officially stated?
"We stopped working with Russia": statement from 9 March 2022
On 9 March 2022 Netpeak Group publicly announced that the agencies Netpeak and Inweb had stopped cooperating with clients from Russia and Belarus, and the services Serpstat, Ringostat, Netpeak Software and AcademyOcean had frozen accounts of users from the aggressor countries — according to the company’s official statement, which was also quoted by AIN.ua. This statement became the starting point for fact-checking.
Despite the above statements about leaving Russia, a key Russian structure of the group apparently demonstrated surprising viability. This is indicated by a number of legal and financial “traces.”
Clue No. 1: an accredited branch of “Netpik” that operated in Russia since 2012
The open registry of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation for accredited branches of foreign legal entities contains an entry about a branch of LLC “NETPIK” that operated in Russia from 27.04.2012 to 27.04.2015, headed by Dmytro Pyskarov. The Russian presence format was defined as a “branch of a foreign legal entity,” and the foreign entity was listed as the Ukrainian LLC “NETPIK” (code 37184690).
The data are confirmed by the FTS of Russia’s official registry and FTS open data. This is very important in the context of what happened next.
A separate entry was found for another legal entity, LLC “CONSULT PROFESSIONAL” (TIN 7717793878). Analysis of Russian registries revealed a notable detail: on 21 April 2022 — two months after the start of the full-scale invasion — the company changed its name from LLC “NETPIK” to the current one.
Rebranding or an attempt to mask a likely Ukrainian origin of the business to preserve presence in the aggressor market?
This legal entity was liquidated only in 30.01.2023 — almost a year after Netpeak Group’s statement about ceasing work with Russia. The data are confirmed by the company cards on RBC Companies and in the SPARK-Interfax database.
According to financial data from FTS open registries, aggregated on reputation.ru and list-org.com, this company increased revenue in 2014–2021 from 413 thousand rubles to over 109 million rubles, and total net profit for the reporting period exceeded 32,8 million rubles. At least 23,127 million rubles in taxes and mandatory payments were paid into the Russian budget during 2017–2022, of which 9 054 rubles were paid in 2022 — already during the full-scale invasion (data for 2022 come from the FTS open data archive package).
The amount is not huge by IT industry standards, but the fact remains: a company associated with a Ukrainian entrepreneur continued to exist and be listed as a taxpayer to the aggressor country’s budget almost a year after its full-scale aggression against Ukraine began.
Notably, according to the Russian resource ALLSEO, the company with the site Netpeaik.Ru long listed the group’s founder Artem Borodatiuk as its CEO.
Clue No. 2: Ringostat and its Russian “double”
The most sensitive discovery concerns the Ringostat product — a call-tracking and end-to-end analytics service that Netpeak/FRACTAL publicly positions as its own Ukrainian development.
Because if “Netpik,” judging by the indicators, was apparently being prepared for closure, another project of the group — the call-tracking service Ringostat — on the contrary showed financial growth. Its activity in Russia, according to the Fractal site, was provided by LLC “Performance Profi,” later renamed LLC “CONSULT PLUS” (TIN 7708393658).
According to List-Org, the historical founder of the Russian LLC “Consult Plus” (formerly “Performance Profi”) from 28.01.2021 to 22.03.2023 was Dmytro Pyskarov — the same person who earlier headed the Russian branch of “Netpik.”
The product bearing the details of this Russian company (TIN 7708393658) was historically hosted on ringostat.com, as seen from an archived copy of the contacts page of Netpeak.ru and a profile on fractal.partners.
This Russian legal entity continued financial activity after 2022. According to FTS of Russia official registries (2022, 2023, 2024), the company transferred at least 5,07 million rubles to Russian budgets and funds in 2022, and a total of at least 9,718 million rubles over 2021–2025.
Revenue data and requisites also match the company card on B2B.house: the company’s legal address until December 2023 was the same Ulansky Lane in Moscow that appears in descriptions of the Ringostat project on specialized Russian sites eto-razvod.ru and resize-web.ru. This company was liquidated only in 14.05.2025.
Such sums are hard to chalk up to “frozen accounts.” This is probable evidence of large-scale commercial activity in the very heart of the aggressor country. Moreover, one of the group’s key top managers, Dmytro Pyskarov, remained the official founder of “Consult Plus” with a 100% stake until 22 March 2023. That contradicts public statements about a complete severing of ties with Russia in February–March 2022.
Additional analysis of links around LLC “CONSULT PLUS” shows that related Russian companies with typical risky signs exist around this legal entity: likely firms created to launder funds, with short lifespans, liquidated or excluded from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities for unreliable information, minimal staff numbers, self-ownership of shares, frequent changes of participants, and a combination of incompatible OKVEDs. In this cluster appear IT/software companies (ADJAIL, ONLINE DEALER), companies trading computer/electronic equipment (MAGNETIK, ALTEK) and firms in the video surveillance/security systems sector (VIDEOGLAZ CENTER).
We therefore assume that the activity of all these companies may also have filled the Russian budget.
Clue No. 4: 29,3% of Ringostat sites are from Russia, as of 2026
StopKor analysts also checked the purely technical trace — independent of any corporate documents. According to the international site technology analysis service BuiltWith, as of 2026 Ringostat is used by 1701 “live” sites, and BuiltWith attributes 498 of them to Russia — about 29,3% of the entire base, the second-largest market for Ringostat after Ukraine. Practically every third site with the Ringostat script is Russian.
This is also confirmed by technical traces: connection codes to script.ringostat.com were found on sites including sharlot.ru, expertproperty.ru and omnicomm.pro. In addition, the product has working integrations with CRM systems most popular in the Russian and CIS market — Bitrix24 and amoCRM/Kommo, as detailed in the service’s knowledge base: integration with Bitrix24 and integration with amoCRM.
Notably, in 2024 Ringostat itself publicly urged Ukrainian clients on its site to refuse those CRMs as “Russian or disguised as neutral” — meaning the product is technically configured to work with the very market the company publicly warns others about.
The Cyprus layer: who might have benefited?
Artem Borodatiuk’s corporate structure is extensive and, according to YouControl, includes legal entities in Ukraine, Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, the UK and Kazakhstan.
Particular attention deserves the Cypriot AB Digital Horizon Syndicate Limited (registration number HE 451879) — according to the Cyprus Company Register, its director is Anna Rossidu and its secretary is Pantelis Vorkas.
The law firm Michael Vorkas & Partners, associated with the company secretary, publicly notes among its practice areas work with Russian corporations and wealthy Russians (Russian HNWI).
Anna Rossidu appears as a nominee director for hundreds of companies in both the Ukrainian and Russian markets — a common Cypriot service model that is not itself a crime but can create an opaque picture of the real beneficiaries.
What does this mean legally?
The discovered set of circumstances — historical presence in Russia, late liquidation of related Russian legal entities, continuation of tax payments to the aggressor’s budget after 24.02.2022, and an ongoing technical presence of the product in the Russian market — requires qualified legal assessment.
If it is confirmed that structures in Artem Borodatiuk’s orbit after 22 February 2022 continued to do business in Russia and fill its budget with taxes, such actions may have signs of serious crimes against the foundations of Ukraine’s national security:
Art. 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Assistance to the aggressor state) — due to support of Russia’s economic potential;
Art. 110-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Financing actions committed to change Ukraine’s borders);
Art. 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Financing terrorism) — since taxes are paid into the budget of a state recognized as a sponsor of terrorism;
Art. 209 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Legalization of proceeds from crime) — due to the use of tangled offshore schemes.
We emphasize: this is only the editorial team’s preliminary assessment based on facts uncovered by our analysts, not a suspicion or accusation — only competent law enforcement and oversight bodies can establish the presence or absence of a crime, and especially the guilt of specific persons, following verification of the uncovered facts.
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