Zelensky Is Looking for a "Plan B" for Kyiv. What Will Happen to Klitschko and Can the Capital Withstand a Harsh Winter?

The preparation of Kyiv for the heating season has triggered another escalation between the President's Office and the capital city administration. On Bankova they even discussed temporarily removing Vitali Klitschko from the position of head of the Kyiv City State Administration (KCSA), but in the end they chose a different path. What is the plan B that the central government is preparing to manage the capital and why this winter may be tougher for Kyiv residents — in the RBC-Ukraine material. Main points: Klitschko's future — on Bankova they discussed removing him from the post of head of the KCSA, but this scenario did not gain the support of a majority of influential members of the presidential team. Zelenskiy's plan — the president proposed creating a special cabinet for Kyiv under the government; according to RBC-Ukraine, the new body could number about ten participants and have consultative or advisory status. Preparations for winter: Kyiv has accumulated more reserve equipment than last year, but construction of large reserve heat sources is not yet completed. Power problems: due to Russian strikes, the capital has lost a significant portion of its own power generation and has become dependent on power supply from other regions. Winter scenarios: RBC-Ukraine sources do not rule out long outages, heating interruptions, and metro shutdowns. The consequences will depend on further attacks and weather conditions. Kyiv’s winter preparation has again become a source of tension between Bankova and Vitali Klitschko. The president publicly accuses the city authorities of insufficient preparation for Russian strikes on the energy sector and seeks new ways to influence the situation in Kyiv. In the mayor's team they emphasize that readiness for winter is the responsibility not only of the city. Yet this story has more than a political dimension. The capital is entering a new winter with damaged heat and power plants and unfinished construction of reserve heat sources. And although Kyiv prepared more actively for this heating season than for the previous one, sources close to RBC-Ukraine do not exclude that this winter could be even harder. The Kyiv question — President 13 October stated that even in border and frontline regions, plans for energy resilience are implemented better than in the capital. He noted that even after occasional Russian strikes, a significant part of Kyiv remains without electricity and water. He announced decisions that would entail not only stronger protection of energy facilities but also changes in approaches to city management. That same day Zelenskiy announced consultations with representatives of the security sector, business, and local government. Among his interlocutors were former SBU head Vasyl Maliuk, businessman Konstantin Yefimenko, and Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov. This immediately sparked rumors that Zelenskiy intends to field against Klitschko in Kyiv a serious opponent. Especially since acting head of the Kyiv Military Civil Administration, Andriy Tkachov, does not stand out for public activity. He is observing different people, talking to them, — a well-informed RBC-Ukraine source said when asked whether the same Maliuk could head the KMVA soon. But the military administration is only one part of Kyiv's complex governance system. Alongside it work the KCSA led by Klitschko and the Kyiv City Council elected by residents. This system has previously generated conflicts over powers and responsibilities. Also read: Two powers of Kyiv. What happens behind the scenes of Bankova and Klitschko’s struggle before winter According to RBC-Ukraine, on Bankova they discussed a much more radical scenario. Two sources independently told the publication that in the president’s circle they were considering the possibility of removing Klitschko from the post of head of the Kyiv City State Administration. One of the supporters of this idea was former presidential office head Andriy Yermak. However, sources say that the majority of influential members of the presidential team — both on Bankova and outside — spoke out against it. Primarily because of legal and administrative consequences of such a decision. The thing is, in Kyiv the posts of mayor and head of the KCSA are tightly linked. Although the head of the state administration is formally appointed by the president, according to a Constitutional Court ruling, the person who leads it must be the mayor elected by Kyiv residents. Moreover, even removing Klitschko from leadership of the state administration would not deprive him of the powers of an elected mayor and influence over the Kyiv City Council. In theory this could be done, but in practice the city’s governance scheme would become even less workable. Klitschko through the Kyiv City Council would block everything. Even access to offices might be problematic, — explained one of the publication’s sources. Moreover, there are structural problems in Kyiv governance under martial law, and such a staffing change would not remove them, RBC-Ukraine sources say. KMVA is a dead-end branch of development. On Tkachenko (Timur Tkachenko, the current head of Kyiv region military administration, — ed.) trying to fight Klitschko and what then? — another source says. In addition, any attempt to constrain the sovereignty of the capital’s authorities would surely provoke strong resistance from the mayor and his allies. Klitschko is subject to two factors. First, the importance of local self-government as such in the eyes of Europeans. Second, Klitschko’s very good connections in European establishment, notably in Germany. As previously reported by sources in the authorities, this factor has already impeded overly sharp actions by Bankova against Klitschko. According to RBC-Ukraine, already now, when things are limited to verbal skirmishes, signals have reached Brussels from Khreschatyk, and European partners have begun to voice their concern. Perhaps Bankova realized that potential negative fallout for Kyiv affects both center and local authorities. There are no takers among those who would like to fight with him in KMVA. Then the mayor spoke in the Verkhovna Rada, answering criticisms about the city’s preparations. And sometime after that, the central government’s rhetoric toward Klitschko softened a bit, one of the mayor’s aides noted. Plan B — In the end, Zelenskiy publicly proposed a softer variant — to create a special cabinet at the government for Kyiv’s issues. I asked the prime minister to gather a special cabinet for Kyiv — managers, strong people. I am ready to personally talk to whoever they name for me and ask him. Create such a cabinet and work out solutions. I will do what I can, — Zelenskiy said at a meeting with journalists 27 October. The president named several surnames of those with whom he spoke about participating in such a cabinet: former deputy prime minister Oleksandr Kubrakov, former prime minister during Poroshenko’s time Volodymyr Hroisman. And the former head of the State Agency for Restoration Sergiy Sukhomlyn, according to Zelenskiy, refused to take part once he heard about Kyiv. According to RBC-Ukraine, the new body could number about ten participants and have consultative or advisory status. That is, its members could not directly issue orders to city authorities. Instead they would propose their decisions to the Cabinet of Ministers, which would then implement them through existing state mechanisms. Such a construction would allow Bankova to exert more influence on solving the capital’s problems without a conflict-driven removal of Klitschko. Why create another energy council or cabinet? The city government already has its own energy security and resilience council, which involved sector experts. It participated in preparing the city’s resilience plan, — a source from the mayor’s circle comments on this idea. At the same time, Klitschko’s team does not rule out that the central authorities may return to the issue of removing the mayor later — when the city situation is most difficult and as a political pretext use the unfinished prep for winter. This version is reinforced by the NSDC decision of 5 August, which spoke of personal responsibility of officials for implementing resilience plan measures. Perfect execution of this plan is impossible. In any case there will be gaps, something will go wrong. This could become an argument against the mayor, — a source suggested. But the NSDC decision does not automatically mean Klitschko’s removal or legal liability. It requires separate legal grounds and a procedure. How Kyiv prepared for a new winter The RBC-Ukraine sources from different political camps agree that this year the Kyiv authorities did more to prepare for the heating season than last year. At the same time, not all equipment that the city reports on appeared this year: some reserves Kyiv accumulated in previous years of full-scale war. According to the Kyiv City State Administration, currently about 700 generators have been prepared for heat and water supply facilities. They are intended to ensure operation of pumps and other important equipment during power outages. For the needs of the water supply system, three diesel power plants were built as well. In addition, the city authorities report the creation of a reserve water intake and ensuring the wastewater system with backup power. This should allow maintaining water supply and wastewater service even during interruptions in centralized power supply. For emergency heating of individual buildings Kyiv has 70 mobile and eight block-modular boiler houses. They can be used, for example, for hospitals and social facilities left without main heating. Most of this reserve was formed in previous years. Also, KCSA reports more than six thousand units of equipment — generators, inverters, and batteries purchased under city programs for apartment buildings. They are intended to support operation of individual building systems during power outages, not to provide full electricity for all apartments. Another area is installing cogeneration units, i.e., small power plants that simultaneously generate electricity and heat. However, the scale of such generation is still far from the city’s overall needs. In winter Kyiv’s load can reach about 1950 MW, while the city has currently launched only 60 MW of cogeneration capacity and plans to reach 200 MW by year-end. According to RBC-Ukraine sources, from 200 to more than 300 MW of local generation is needed just to support critical infrastructure. In addition to creating reserves, the city and central authorities are carrying out measures to physically protect important energy facilities from Russian attacks. Some measures are carried out by the Kyiv City State Administration, others by the State Agency for Restoration. These works are not yet completed. The most significant, but also one of the most problematic directions of preparedness remains creating reserve heat supply in case of further destruction of large TPPs. Unlike mobile boiler houses intended for heating individual buildings temporarily, these are capacities designed to heat large residential areas. The overall Kyiv resilience plan foresees creating such heat sources with capacity up to 2,1 GW. This year work was conducted on about 1,6 GW: the city is responsible for construction of facilities with capacity over 1000 MW, and the State Agency for Restoration for about 560 MW, including six reserve boiler houses. However, not all of these facilities are ready to operate. Sources doubt that all capacities planned to be launched this year will be commissioned by year-end. At the end of October the Ministry of Community Development and Territories confirmed unfinished construction. Klitschko himself 23 October in a BBC Ukraine interview said that Kyiv's overall resilience plan is more than 60% complete, and the city plans to finish its implementation by December. Kyiv this year is preparing for winter more actively (photo: Vitalii Nosach, RBC-Ukraine) RBC-Ukraine sources acknowledge that despite the substantial amount of work done, both the city authorities and central structures lagged behind on some necessary measures. One government source cites delays in decisions at the Kyiv City Council as an example. In particular, decisions on the placement of energy equipment were delayed; the necessary vote occurred only in September, while the relevant decisions were in May. Problems with land matters, which hampered project launch, were publicly discussed earlier by the Agency for Restoration. Could Kyiv have fully restored its district heating plants? No. Could cogeneration be installed in parallel? Yes. Could there have been better work with electricity distribution systems? Yes. Overall, a share of about 30-50% could have been improved, but not to one hundred percent, — one official says. And he does not fully exonerate the central authority. We still treat Klitschko as a political opponent with corresponding consequences, — the source says. Sources close to the mayor note the difficulties with agreeing and funding projects from the central authorities. The resilience plan began being developed in spring, but was approved by the NSDC only in August. Klitschko’s team believes delays in approving the document cost the city valuable time. The central government holds a different view: the initial version needed refinement, and implementing it at the proposed scale was financially unrealistic. In the meantime, the cost of planned measures was cut from 67 to 37 billion hryvnias. In autumn there were delays with budget payments. The Kyiv City State Administration said that as a result some work on reserve heat and power supply had to be paused. In October payments began to be unblocked. The government confirmed the problems with expenditures, attributing them to a temporary budget deficit. Overall, of course, preparations for this winter are better than for the last. But the problem is that they prepared for the challenges of the past, and new ones appeared: reactive drones, anti-aircraft shortfalls, and so on, — another RBC-Ukraine source notes. Why this winter may be harder for Kyiv After numerous Russian strikes, Kyiv’s energy infrastructure is already significantly more damaged than at the start of last heating season. Therefore, despite greater reserves, RBC-Ukraine sources do not rule out that this winter could be even tougher for the capital. One of the biggest problems now is the operation of Kyiv’s thermal power plants (TPPs). Under normal conditions they supplied the city with heat and generated substantial electricity for the capital. According to sources, TPPs-5, TPP-6 and the Darnytska TPP have ceased electricity production as a result of Russian strikes. Kyiv now relies heavily on electricity imports from other regions via the unified energy system of Ukraine — through substations that are also consistently subjected to enemy attacks and periodically go offline. If these facilities are damaged, even with electricity available in the national system, delivering power to the city may be difficult. Residents already felt the consequences in October 8, when the metro temporarily stopped due to voltage drops from external power sources. One source explains: the metro is a very large energy consumer, so in case of new Russian strikes and sudden energy supply problems, decisions could be made to temporarily disconnect such facilities to quickly stabilize the system. Or, in case of a catastrophic electricity shortage, the metro would essentially shut down by itself. No less difficult is heating. Kyiv’s TPPs remain targets of Russian attacks. New damage could threaten their heat supply, and the reserve boilers that could partly replace large plants are not yet fully ready. At the same time, even firing all planned reserve boiler houses may not guarantee sufficient capacity to maintain normative indoor temperatures in all apartments during severe cold. RBC-Ukraine sources describe various scenarios for how Kyiv can weather this winter. Read also: Between plans and reality: how Ukraine is preparing for a difficult winter If the situation worsens, the city’s maximum capability with its own resources will be to operate water supply and sewage systems, electricity and heat for critical infrastructure. In some districts it may be possible to preserve heating for residential buildings. In areas where homes lack heat, if technically possible they will be temporarily connected to reserve heat sources, one source predicts. Another source is more pessimistic. He believes that in case of repeated large-scale attacks Kyiv could face long metro outages and a situation where electricity and heat can be provided only to critical infrastructure. Either way, the outlook for power and heating on the left bank of the city is expected to be more difficult than on the right bank, the source adds. However, none of these scenarios can be considered guaranteed. Consequences will depend mainly on the scale of new attacks, the nature of damage, air temperatures, and the energy sector and utilities’ ability to restore equipment. A separate risk is Russian strikes on bridges over the Dnipro, which have already caused bridge damage and movement restrictions in Kyiv. RBC-Ukraine sources believe that completely destroying large bridges is difficult, but that is not even necessary for serious transport problems. Even partial damage can force closures for inspections and repair, complicating links between the riverbanks. Sources say that such a result is exactly what Russian attacks might be calculated to achieve. The winter will be hardest in the largest cities: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, which has already seen KA-Bi drones. Russians are deliberately trying to make life there unbearable to force people to leave, to increase social tension in winter, the source notes. FAQ: - Why does Zelenskiy want to create a special cabinet for Kyiv? — The president proposed creating a cabinet or council under the Cabinet of Ministers to address Kyiv’s problems. RBC-Ukraine reports such a body could have advisory functions: draft proposals for the government but not directly govern the city authorities. - Can Vitali Klitschko be removed from the post of head of the KCSA? — According to RBC-Ukraine sources, such a possibility was discussed in the president’s circle, but the majority of influential members of Zelenskiy’s team opposed it. The scenario also involves legal difficulties, since per the Constitutional Court decision, the KCSA must be headed by the mayor elected by Kyiv residents. - How prepared did Kyiv get for this winter 2026–2027? — The city has reserve generators, mobile boiler rooms, and additional sources of electricity. Some equipment was accumulated in previous years, and some large reserve heat capacities have not yet been commissioned. Overall, sources say this year’s preparation is more active than last year. - Why could Kyiv experience long power outages this winter? — RBC-Ukraine sources say that due to Russian attacks the city’s large TPPs stopped producing electricity. The capital is more dependent on imports from other regions, and damage to power lines and substations can hinder delivering electricity to the city. - What could happen with heating and the metro? — In case of new large-scale strikes, there could be prolonged metro outages and heating disruptions. Reserve boiler houses can partly compensate for the loss of main heat sources, but under severe cold their capacity may be insufficient to maintain normative temperatures in all buildings.