Old - New Faces of Poroshenko

Old - New Faces of Poroshenko

While the country anxiously follows the signing of the Association Agreement in Brussels or the peace talks in Donetsk, Petro Poroshenko’s apparatus is preparing personnel changes. The new president is filling his quota in power. In particular — in the regions.

Ihor Palytsia, Ihor Kolomoyskyi’s proxy in Odesa region, may be replaced by Oleksii Honcharenko. Sources from Ukrayinska Pravda claim that a decree appointing Honcharenko is already being prepared, and the candidate himself has already submitted the necessary documents to the presidential administration.

Honcharenko was head of Poroshenko’s campaign headquarters in Odesa region. He also accompanied him to Crimea when the now-serving president went to the peninsula at the start of Russia’s military aggression.

Oleksii Honcharenko, photo from his Facebook

Until February 2014, Honcharenko worked as deputy chair of the Odesa Regional Council — a position he obtained while he was in the Party of Regions. In 2012 he ran for the Verkhovna Rada in an Odesa district but lost to the leader of the Rodina party, Ihor Markov. He is the son of former Odesa mayor Oleksii Kostusev, who left the family when Honcharenko was 3 years old and did not take part in his upbringing.

Although Honcharenko’s chances of heading the region are high, Ihor Kolomoyskyi has thrown significant effort into keeping Palytsia in office. Before the elections, Kolomoyskyi met with Poroshenko, seeking guarantees to preserve positions for himself and Palytsia.

On the other hand, considering Kolomoyskyi’s relationship with Odesa’s newly elected mayor Hennadii Trukhanov, a Palytsia–Trukhanov “alliance” is dangerous because it could lead to the owner of Privat’s influence over this region becoming too strong. Together, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk regions would, in the event of early parliamentary elections, guarantee entry to Parliament for any political force.

However, it seems Palytsia himself was not fully convinced he would remain long as governor, since he did not give up his parliamentary mandate, combining it with his role as head of the regional administration.

Changes are also expected in the leadership of Zaporizhia region. The region is currently headed by former MP and ex-mayor of Berdyansk Valerii Baranov — under UDAR’s quota. According to sources from Ukrayinska Pravda, Poroshenko sees current deputy Andrii Pavelko as his possible successor.

Andrii Pavelko, photo from his Facebook

He is a former ally of Arseniy Yatseniuk, former head of the Dnipropetrovsk branch of Front for Change and the local football federation. He became an MP in 2012 on the Batkivshchyna party lists together with his father-in-law Leonid Serhiienko. Both were later expelled from Batkivshchyna with the wording “for betrayal of the interests of the people of Ukraine and systematic failure to follow faction decisions.”

After that, Pavelko began building his political project called “Democrats,” and in the presidential elections he headed Poroshenko’s Dnipropetrovsk regional headquarters. But since the new administration does not seem to challenge Kolomoyskyi’s influence in Dnipropetrovsk region, Pavelko is being given an adjacent region. In turn, Kolomoyskyi is promoting Pavlo Kravchenko, head of his ferroalloy plant, as head of Zaporizhia region.

There is no clarity regarding Kharkiv region, whose governor is Ihor Baluta — a person from Arsen Avakov’s team, who in 2005-2010 years headed the social department of the regional administration.

Another contender for Kharkiv region is Hennadii Kernes, who is trying to build a reputation as a guarantor of calm in the region. Kernes is lobbied by Ihor Kolomoyskyi, with whom he has friendly ties.

The owner of PrivatBank offers Kyiv his services as a guarantor of peace in regions where there is a possible risk of separatism — these are Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Odesa regions.

At the same time, Kolomoyskyi and his team no longer hide their political ambitions. Leadership in these densely populated regions is a powerful launchpad, especially given Kolomoyskyi’s team’s ability to win over local populations, which is noticeable in Dnipropetrovsk region.

In western Ukraine, according to sources, the Svoboda party was promised that their interests would be taken into account, in particular regarding keeping their nominees in governor positions. Meanwhile, for the head of Lviv region, the favorite for the post is former National Bank head Stepan Kubiv, who ran Kredobank here and led Batkivshchyna’s Lviv headquarters in the last parliamentary elections under Yatseniuk’s quota.

Ihor Hryniv, deputy head of Poroshenko’s headquarters, who is also named as a contender for governor of Lviv region, is unlikely to agree to move from Kyiv and give up his work as an MP and political consultant concurrently.

Yarema takes control of the Prosecutor General’s Office

Meanwhile, Vitalii Yarema, who last week became prosecutor general, is strengthening his ranks with loyal personnel. The Prosecutor General’s Office itself stands on the threshold of a major reorganization — after Yarema’s arrival all employees were taken off the staff list, which is a necessary precondition for reforming the structure.

Thus, Mykola Holomsha lost the post of first deputy prosecutor general and, it seems, his place in the leadership of the GPU altogether. Yarema appointed Mykola Herasymiuk to this position. During Yanukovych’s time he was deputy head of the State Executive Service, and in 2014 he became prosecutor of the city of Kyiv.

Mykola Herasymiuk, photo from the GPU website

Herasymiuk is called close to Serhii Lyovochkin; he will exercise “general supervision” and represent the state’s interests in courts.

Another person not unfamiliar to Lyovochkin, Anatolii Matios, was appointed deputy prosecutor who will carry out procedural leadership over investigations — what was previously called oversight of lawfulness by investigators.

Matios worked in the Kyiv prosecutor’s office, headed the SBU directorate in Lviv and Odesa regions, and during Yanukovych’s time Lyovochkin brought him in as deputy head of the Main Control Department of the Presidential Administration. He is the brother of writer and UDAR deputy Mariia Matios.

The Main Investigative Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office will remain with Oleksii Bahanets. He is close to Yurii Lutsenko, who is effectively Poroshenko’s “steward” in the Solidarity party.

Viktor Shokin, close to Poroshenko, returned to the Prosecutor General’s Office. Despite retirement age — Shokin will turn 62 years old this year — he will oversee the so-called “police bloc,” investigations in the Interior Ministry, SBU, tax authorities, as well as operational-investigative activities.

In 2005 it was Shokin — who oversaw investigations in the Prosecutor General’s Office — who was credited with initiating criminal cases against Borys Kolesnikov and Ihor Kolomoyskyi.

Anatolii Danylenko, personally loyal to Yarema, became deputy prosecutor general who will be responsible for personnel issues.

They have been together “through life.” When Yarema headed the Kyiv city militia, Danylenko was his deputy. And when Yarema became first vice premier in Yatseniuk’s government, Danylenko was appointed head of his service. His competencies included technical functions such as forming Yarema’s schedule, his meetings, trips, etc.

A few vacancies remain in the leadership of the Prosecutor General’s Office, since at times the number of deputy generals reached nine people.

There are talks that another deputy prosecutor general may be Oleh Bachun, former head of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv — the place where all acts of state authorities are challenged. Bachun’s name became known during the political war between Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko when he opposed Andrii Portnov.

Although Bachun comes from the railway clan of Heorhii Kirpa, he has personal friendly relations with Yarema, which again indicates the new prosecutor general’s desire to surround himself with people not from the system, not tied into the prosecutorial network of “godfather-brother-in-law-brother,” but who will serve him personally.

Yarema also appointed the city prosecutor of Kyiv: the post went to the young 35-year-old Serhii Yuldashev, whose background is little known.

Serhii Yuldashev, photo from the GPU

According to Ukrayinska Pravda sources, he is a person of Vitalii Bilous, who for a short time worked as first deputy to Viktor Pshonka after Renat Kuzmin’s dismissal.

It will be interesting to see what will happen to Odesa prosecutor Mykola Stoianov in the context of Yarema’s appointment.

Stoianov was scandalously appointed by the previous prosecutor general Oleg Makhnitsky, who, although representing the Svoboda party, put in charge of the region a person who refused to investigate crimes against Svoboda members beaten by the pro-Russian politician Ihor Markov.

Governor of Odesa region Ihor Palytsia directly advocated for Stoianov’s appointment, further confirming rumors about special relations between Svoboda nationalists and Kolomoyskyi. Palytsia even sent Makhnitsky an official request for Stoianov’s appointment, which clearly contradicts the legal prohibition on influence over prosecutorial bodies.

Most interestingly, when Ukrayinska Pravda tried to officially obtain Palytsia’s request about Stoianov, the Prosecutor General’s Office reported that such a letter was... absent — while the Odesa regional administration confirmed it exists and was indeed sent to Makhnitsky.

Will the Ministry of Defense be given to a billionaire?

If changes in the prosecutor’s office caused by Poroshenko’s election are proceeding at full speed, talks are underway in the government about replacing ministers — the minister of economy, the minister of finance and the minister of defense of Ukraine.

Yatseniuk can barely hide that he expected more from Pavlo Sheremeta — a man who truly knows a lot but can implement little in practice and turned out unready for bureaucratic work. Dissatisfaction with Sheremeta has been growing since March 2014, when he increased his trips to regional centers, prompting a backstage attempt by Arseniy Yatseniuk to block regional travels.

Among possible successors to Sheremeta is named Oleksandr Danyliuk — a former adviser to Prime Minister Yurii Yekhanurov, who during Yanukovych’s time was part of the group drafting an economic reform plan at the Presidential Administration.

There are also talks about Yatseniuk’s dissatisfaction with Finance Minister Oleksandr Shlapak. According to sources, in various conversations the prime minister suggested Shlapak should be changed, but no alternative candidate has been identified.

And the biggest intrigue concerns the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. This quota belongs to the president of Ukraine, and changes in this post have been discussed since the first day of Petro Poroshenko’s election.

Among the candidates mentioned is Viktor Muzhenko, who is one of the leaders of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in eastern Ukraine. From time to time Viktor Baloha is also mentioned as a possible next defense minister.

But recently there has been increasing talk that the Ministry of Defense could be headed by billionaire Yurii Kosiuk, owner of the agroholding Myronivsky Hliboproduct, which produces goods under the brand Nasha Ryaba.

Yurii Kosiuk, photo Vinnytsia.Info

The logic of such appointments is reminiscent of the practice when Yulia Tymoshenko made Valerii Khoroshkovskyi and Serhii Buriak heads of customs and tax administrations.

In addition to a possible career in the Ministry of Defense, Ukrayinska Pravda sources predict that Yurii Kosiuk could become a possible founder of a new political project — together with Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Serhii Tihipko, Vitalii Khomutynnik and Andrii Verevskyi.

Kosiuk himself has never been involved in politics before, but his partner Ihor Tarasiuk was elected to parliament as a Our Ukraine candidate and for five years during Yushchenko’s presidency was his steward — heading the State Administration of Affairs.

Moreover, Tarasiuk and Kosiuk effectively lobbied to place their people in the right positions — for a long time their representative in government was Minister of Agrarian Policy Yurii Melnyk, whom they even managed to insert into the Communist Party quota by negotiating with Petro Symonenko.

Appointing Kosiuk will pose another challenge for Petro Poroshenko regarding the separation of business from politics. But if the president does not view this as a problem, what prevents the poultry billionaire from becoming defense minister?

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