Removal of Chernihiv Mayor’s Powers — A Dangerous Wild Precedent for Others

Removal of Chernihiv mayor’s powers — a dangerous wild precedent for others

Against the backdrop of massive searches and resignations that made headlines in the first days of February, another significant story was lost. The Lviv Court of Appeal put an end to the case of Chernihiv mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko, who is prohibited from holding the office of city mayor for one year. This decision is not subject to appeal.

The appeal challenged the decision of the Yavoriv District Court, which last 7 December sentenced the Chernihiv mayor to a one-year suspension from office. The court upheld a fine of 6,8 thousand UAH, but canceled an additional fine of 3,4 thousand UAH. However, such a “discount” likely did not please the mayor. And his fellow mayors now saw what confrontation with the Presidential Office might end with, notes the publication "Glavcom."

Meanwhile, according to high-ranking local government representatives, the Office of the President has only gotten a taste for it and, it seems, does not intend to stop with Atroshenko. According to Glavcom’s sources, after Atroshenko mayors of other large regional centers could be suspended for various reasons. Arguments for the court can always be found in such difficult times. For certain headstrong mayors, those arguments have already been formulated…

Despite the absence of public scandals, with the caveat of wartime, Andriy Yermak, head of the Presidential Office, has plenty of city leaders whom he thinks simply occupy seats they don’t deserve. The clearest example is the tug-of-war between the capital’s mayor and the Presidential Office. For now it’s a stalemate, although the persistent attempt to take some of Klitschko’s powers did materialize because of the war. The Presidential Office appointed the head of the Kyiv Military City Administration. And that did not calm the Presidential Office either. According to sources close to Klitschko, the next episodes of the “searches” series are planned specifically at the Kyiv City Hall.

The experience of taming mayors tested in Chernihiv and Kyiv is planned to be transferred to other cities in the near future. Glavcom’s interlocutors at the Presidential Office predict that the introduction of military administrations reporting directly to the center will first affect border cities. In conditions of aggression they allegedly require the center’s “special attention,” and this argument will supposedly be favorably received by the local population. At the same time, mayors who have shown too much independence can thereby be sidelined without any suspensions.

Who is next on the list to be “demoted” after Atroshenko and Klitschko?

Suspended Chernihiv mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko intends to appeal the verdict to the European Court

Compared with the multimillion schemes uncovered among higher echelons of power, Chernihiv mayor Atroshenko’s offense seems utterly petty. The mayor was found to have a conflict of interest: in September 2022 the NACP drew up the corresponding protocol. According to it, Atroshenko ordered his driver to take his wife’s Tesla abroad. The mayor’s driver was placed on a business trip and budget funds were allocated, including for fuel. The wife herself left Ukraine at the start of the Russian invasion in the official Toyota Camry. The State Bureau of Investigation stated that she used that car at public expense for several months.

Of course, Atroshenko did not admit guilt and accused the Presidential Office, with which he has long been at odds, of fabricating the case. The dismissed mayor appealed to the head of state as guarantor of the Constitution and called on Zelensky to stop the political attack organized by the president’s inner circle, arguing that they should be united against the enemy.

Clearly, the car story turned out to be only a formal pretext. The Chernihiv mayor complained that the Presidential Office’s biased attitude toward him resulted in searches of municipal enterprises, the city council, and hundreds of criminal cases. Among the reasons for such attention, Atroshenko cited his independent participation in local elections with his own party (although many other current mayors did the same), disagreements over compensation for regional heating tariffs, and Atroshenko’s partnership with Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko, whose parties signed a cooperation agreement. On top of that came a conflict in the 206 constituency, where repeat parliamentary elections were to be held after the death of MP Anton Polyakov. There, the Servant of the People party did not even risk fielding its own candidate, while Atroshenko together with Klitschko backed a joint candidate — Chernihiv City Council secretary Oleksandr Lomak. However, the war prevented that plan from being realized.

At the same time, the war did not break the agreements between the mayors of Kyiv and Chernihiv. The Association of Ukrainian Cities, chaired by Klitschko, defended Atroshenko. Its statement said that during wartime thousands of cars, buses, and train cars transported people westward at the expense of municipalities and the state, and the families of many city heads became prime targets for the enemy. Therefore the mayor was obliged to send his family away to focus on defending the city and community. The Association assessed actions against Atroshenko as an attempt to suppress local self-government and violate citizens’ democratic rights.

On the eve of the Appeal Court session on 27 January, a whole landing party of heads of 30 cities arrived in Lviv. But the session was postponed to 1 February. In addition to Klitschko and Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyi, who hosted his colleagues, those who came to court in support of Atroshenko included Zhytomyr head Serhii Sukhomlyn and MP from European Solidarity Oleh Syniutka. However, this team did not help much. The suspended mayor promised to challenge the court decision in the European Court.

Interestingly, Sadovyi and Sukhomlyn are members of an organization somewhat competing with the Association of Cities — the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. It is something like the Council for Regional Development that operated under President Poroshenko. The initiative to create the Congress in 2021 came from the Presidential Office. However, Kirill Tymoshenko, the conduit between the Presidential Office and the regions who carefully wove a web of relations between the center and local elites, has already been dismissed from the Presidential Office. And the resignations of a number of regional governors who followed Tymoshenko have now upset balances at the local level that had, however imperfectly, formed.

Which other regional center mayors might face a trick similar to Atroshenko’s? Glavcom’s sources name several candidates.

Poltava. Mamai

Controversial Poltava mayor Oleksandr Mamai may face prison time for disclosing classified information

Poltava mayor Oleksandr Mamai is another regional center leader mired in court cases. At the end of last year he was notified of suspicion for unauthorized disclosure of information about the deployment of Armed Forces units. Investigators say the mayor published information that should not be made public. Specifically, it concerned the location in Poltava of a new large military unit that would be responsible for three regions. For excessive loquacity Mamai faces up to 12 years in prison. He became the first official of such rank to be suspected of “exposing” military positions. In response, the mayor recorded an address to the president explaining that the information was open (because it had been sent to deputies and city council employees), and that he has long been “hunted” and targeted for removal from office.

But suspending Mamai, as the prosecutor sought, proved not so simple. First there was an epidemic of recusals of all judges in the Oktyabrsky District Court, which was supposed to hear the case. Motions for preventive measures and for suspending the mayor were sent to the Poltava Court of Appeal to transfer the case to another court. That court became the Kyiv District Court of Poltava, which refused both to impose preventive measures on Mamai and to suspend him from office. The prosecutor appealed that decision and sought to have the mayor detained, but the district court’s ruling on the preventive measure remained unchanged on 30 January.

Notably, the rather notorious Mamai does not enjoy the same support from fellow local self-government leaders as Atroshenko. The former “regional” was already stripped of powers in a previous mayoral term, but in 2018 that was done not by a court but by the city council. Mamai disagreed with that decision, and later anomalous things began happening with the Unified State Register, where the previously dismissed mayor reappeared as the legitimate city head. The prosecutor charged Mamai with offenses such as obstructing the lawful economic activity of a legal entity — Poltava City Council — and organizing unauthorized interference in the operation of an information system.

Mamai’s long tongue harms him a lot: he opposed decommunization and avoided renaming streets in the city, refrained from voting to recognize Russia as the aggressor, said that the Donbas is “fought over by America and Russia,” and as recently as February this year categorically asserted there would be no Russian invasion or war. In the Myrotvorets database Mamai is listed as an “accomplice of terrorists and Russian occupiers.”

But that did not prevent the politician from winning mayoral elections for the third time in 2020. His opponent in the second round was the pro-government Servant of the People candidate Serhii Ivashchenko — the difference between them was 5,6%. The opponent’s team accused the winner of a “widespread and proven system of vote-buying, cynical transportation and deception of voters.” So the Presidential Office has a grudge against Mamai.

The story with the inconvenient Poltava mayor could be pushed by moving the case as far as possible from Poltava courts, which clearly act with regard for the city’s leader, as happened with Atroshenko, whose fate was decided in Lviv region. And because court sessions are held behind closed doors, you cannot guarantee that the accusation of disclosing classified information will not be supplemented by other sins of Mamai, of which, if desired, plenty can be found.

Kharkiv. Terekhov

Gennady Kernes’s “successor” Ihor Terekhov may turn out to be surplus to the arrangement being tuned in Kyiv

Unlike his Poltava colleague, Ihor Terekhov is currently in his first term as Kharkiv mayor. After the death of the charismatic Hennadiy Kernes, his long-time ally positioned himself as his successor and, having gained informal support from local elites, won the elections. By the principle “let’s live peacefully,” Terekhov built relations with the central government, assuring it he would continue Kernes’s approach of not needlessly irritating the Presidential Office. Zelensky’s team did not even field a candidate against Terekhov, understanding the slim prospects, showing that the president’s team and Kernes’s successor were on the same side.

Before the large-scale war, Kharkiv authorities desperately fought to restore General Hryhorenko Avenue’s old name — Marshal Zhukov — and opposed widespread decommunization, but after Russian rockets began falling on the city Terekhov came to his senses. He now supports rejecting anything that in any way associates with Russian aggression. Even so, deputies of the regional council only with great difficulty renamed the local academic Russian Pushkin Theater. “What is Pushkin guilty of that Putin was born?” wonders the Kharkiv mayor, in whose city there is still Pushkinska Street and a station of the same name.

Increasingly, Terekhov plays his own game, although during martial law and in light of a possible new Russian offensive on a frontline and border region, these conflicts do not surface outwardly. For now. But the mayor, who inherited from Kernes not only the mayoral chair but key factions in the regional and city councils, holds significant cards to show independence. For example, there have already been precedents of disrupting regional council sessions by forces of the Kernes Bloc.

And although Terekhov and Kharkiv Regional State Administration head Oleh Syniehubov try to demonstrate they act in concert, sometimes belonging to different camps shows. For example, in his managerial style the mayor publicly appealed to the head of the RDA and to Kharkivoblenergo demanding clear schedules of power outages and strict adherence to them. However, it seems Terekhov may not be able to show such independence much longer. Kharkiv is one of the cities where the introduction of a military administration in the near future is the most realistic prospect.

During his mayoral term Terekhov has become a defendant in a court case related to the Russian language. Language ombud Taras Kremen fined the Kharkiv mayor for wanting to use the aggressor country’s language during telethon appearances and issued a warning regarding the use of Russian on Terekhov’s verified social media pages. He paid a fine of 3400 UAH, but said he will continue to speak Russian to Kharkiv residents, while officially speaking Ukrainian. He also sued Kremen over the second fine as a private individual, not as mayor. The first hearing in the case is to take place on 8 February.

But he will not be dismissed for that. What could really make Terekhov worry is the resignation of Kyrylo Tymoshenko from the Presidential Office and problems faced by politicians considered the political sponsors of the Kharkiv mayor in the capital. We are talking about OPZZh MPs Ihor Abramovych and Vadym Stolar. Their relations with Presidential Office head Andriy Yermak are now quite strained. With Tymoshenko’s departure, long-standing agreements that made Terekhov a shared protégé of both the Presidential Office and the influential Abramovych are breaking down. According to all information, fighters of the “Monaco battalion” Abramovych and Stolar will lose their parliamentary mandates this week. Stolar, who recently arrived in Ukraine from warm countries, was not even allowed to leave the country again and was also subjected to searches.

For now Terekhov is presenting a new General Plan for the city, partners in which are global banks and foreign consultants. But de facto, in wartime local governance is already being carried out primarily by central executive bodies. If a military administration is established in the city, Terekhov very likely could become superfluous in that structure…

Dnipro. Filatov

Dnipro mayor Borys Filatov now consults on city management with his ally Hennadiy Korban remotely

The scandal over the revocation of citizenship and denial of entry for Dnipro mayor Borys Filatov’s “right hand” Hennadiy Korban has somewhat changed the mechanism of general governance in the city. Now the decision-making office is located not in the elite Dnipro residential complex “Amsterdam,” from where Korban issued instructions and hosted visitors before being expelled from the country, but in London, where he relocated. Thus the “Filatov-Korban” tandem continues to run one of the largest industrial centers, but recent personnel reshuffles in Kyiv could negatively affect their positions.

The father of the dismissed Kyrylo Tymoshenko — regional council deputy from Servant of the People Vladlen Tymoshenko — has long ties with Korban and worked as a top manager in companies associated with him. Such ties could at least have smoothed communication between Dnipro authorities and the Presidential Office, relations that were never smooth. It’s worth recalling the president’s early visits to Dnipro and a rather tough conversation with Filatov about opening the bridge connecting the banks of the Dnipro. But later, according to Filatov, all misunderstandings with the central government were resolved.

“When necessary, I call Kyrylo Tymoshenko, who is responsible for regional policy,” Filatov said in an interview with Glavcom in April 2022. He assured he had long smoothed relations with the Presidential Office and praised Zelensky for the “titanium balls” he showed the world during the war.

During Poroshenko’s presidency Filatov made it clear that despite his sharp tongue and ostentatious radicalism, he is quite negotiable. For example, after his friend and ally Korban was detained in 2015 and spent years in pretrial detention and courts on charges of leading an organized criminal group, Filatov maintained constructive relations with the central government and even spoke at a forum supporting Poroshenko’s second-term bid. Korban, who was later cleared of all charges, said he had a falling out with Filatov, in part because such overt support spoiled their team’s relations with Zelensky.

Now hits against the mayor of Dnipro come again via Korban. Filatov said in the immediate aftermath that ensuring Dnipro’s defense without his partner has become much harder, but he urged hotheads not to hold any rallies or write petitions about it. Korban lists several reasons why the Presidential Office took the radical step of revoking his citizenship: suspicion he said too much about Ukrainian authorities and Yermak to Congresswoman Victoria Spartz, his friendship with prickly journalist Yurii Butusov, and misunderstandings during the war between the Cabinet and regional authorities.

Complaints that the center does not hear local self-government are one of Filatov’s favorite tunes. It is no coincidence that the Dnipro mayor is one of the ideologues of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, where he is deputy head of the Chamber of Local Authorities. His party project “Proposition,” which showed quite a decent result for a newcomer, had long-term plans to unite with regionally authoritative figures such as Klitschko, Atroshenko, Groysman. But it’s clear that that question is postponed to better times.

Atroshenko’s example, whom Filatov supported, naturally cannot fail to alarm him. But the hyperactive and garrulous head of Dnipro, who believes loud PR guarantees inviolability, has repeatedly shown he can adapt to any conditions. Now he will have to find common ground with the new head of Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration, who will be appointed in place of the dismissed Valentyn Reznichenko.

Odesa. Trukhanov

Hennadii Trukhanov, who has led Odesa since 2014, is trailed by a shadow of a pro-Russian politician

From the start of the full-scale aggression Odesa was a particularly tempting target for the occupiers. Around it intertwined the tragedy canonized by propagandists on 2 May 2014, the “fame of a Russian city” “founded” by Catherine II, and, finally, access to the sea, losing which would effectively deprive Ukraine of its status as a maritime state. Considering all these risks, the patriotic public long sounded the alarm about Odesa mayor Hennadii Trukhanov — a former Party of Regions member who was attributed not only pro-Russian views but also possession of an aggressor-state passport.

Trukhanov is a long-serving mayor — he has led Odesa since 2014, when he first won a special election, and was re-elected in 2015 and again in 2020. But he is on a bigger hook than his Chernihiv counterpart. The Odesa mayor is suspected of misappropriating city land plots and legalizing illegally obtained income. In addition to Trukhanov, 15 other people were notified of suspicion. The events concern 2016, when the Odesa City Council bought a building from a private structure at an inflated price; the building had earlier been part of the property complex of the Krayan factory. Trukhanov and Co. ended up on the defendants’ bench, but the local Malynovskyi District Court dismissed all the evidence presented by the prosecution. That verdict was overturned by the Appellate Chamber of the High Anti-Corruption Court, which is now considering the case.

Not only Trukhanov suffers from the hand of justice. A purge is underway in Odesa among such prominent local businessmen as Borys Kaufman and Oleksandr Granovskyi. At the end of last year they were charged with creating a criminal organization and bribery.

An NABU message states that the Kaufman–Granovskyi group “took control of practically all issues of the city’s economic life, including interaction with developers, procurements at the expense of the local budget, the activities of communal enterprises and other aspects of interaction with business. To ensure uninterrupted implementation of set goals, the organizers of the criminal organization established a process of systematic bribery of officials and local council deputies.” It is unlikely such massive violations could have occurred without the mayor’s knowledge or at least awareness.

Still, Trukhanov managed to come through the Krayan case unscathed under the previous government, when he openly expressed support for then-president Poroshenko. At the start of Zelensky’s term he compared the new administration to “a boy in a brothel.” “We are not friends, we don’t celebrate holidays together,” Zelensky said of his relationship with Trukhanov, noting they had known each other since the Kvartal troupe’s festival in Odesa. Still, the president then stressed that if Odesans wanted to get rid of criminality in the city, they should elect a new mayor. But the electorate did not heed that presidential advice.

In October last year Zelensky advanced a petition from concerned citizens, instructing the SBU and the Interior Ministry to examine the facts set out in it. In particular, it alleged that Trukhanov sabotages the dismantling of monuments to Alexander Suvorov and Catherine II (the latter was recently removed), supposedly advocates compromises with occupiers regarding Crimea, and tries to restore communist toponyms in Odesa.

To be fair, Trukhanov now hardly expresses his former pro-Russian sentiments, proclaims his patriotism, and tries not to openly confront the Presidential Office. But the fact that this local political heavyweight is clearly not one of the current ruling team, and that he carries such a trail behind him, makes his prospects shaky.

Pavlo Vuyets, published in the outlet “Glavcom”