Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Local elections were supposed to take place in the fall of 2025, but their holding is prohibited while martial law is in effect. Mayors and councils elected back in 2020 continue to exercise their powers.
However, the absence of elections does not mean that local authorities have remained as voters formed them in 2020. Mayors die, resign, are mobilized, lose their posts by court decisions, or move to other jobs. Their powers are assumed by council secretaries, and temporary performance of mayoral duties sometimes stretches for years. At the same time, in some cities military administrations are being created that operate alongside elected bodies or take over their powers. All of this changes the system of local government without the direct participation of voters.
But not only the composition of local government has changed; the conditions in which it operates have also changed — even where the mayors elected in 2020 remain in office.
The full-scale invasion caught local self-government in the middle of an incomplete decentralization. Communities had been given powers and finances, but their division with the state remained insufficiently clear. The question of state supervision over the legality of local council decisions also remained unresolved. The law No.4677 adopted in November 2025 after difficult compromises is supposed to come into force after the end of martial law.
The war added to these contradictions the question of interaction between local self-government and military administrations. Against the backdrop of budgetary resource redistribution in favor of the center, an activation of law enforcement agencies, and the strengthening role of military administrations, it becomes clearer why the Association of Ukrainian Cities resists strict state supervision so vigorously. The figures from our study only amplify concerns that such supervision could become another tool of pressure on communities.
However, the risks of strengthening state supervision do not eliminate another problem: existing control mechanisms often do not work, in particular because of informal local arrangements. So the threat of political pressure from the center does not justify the de facto lack of accountability for decisions of local authorities.
Thus, the question is no longer only how many mayors elected in 2020 remain in office. It is who actually governs Ukrainian cities in the fifth year of the full-scale war without local elections. Where did these leaders get their powers and to whom are they accountable? How temporary are the management mechanisms introduced during the war? And what do these changes say about the balance between local self-government and the state vertical in conditions of a protracted war?
This is what we tried to find out by analyzing governance models in 339 Ukrainian city communities and the city of Kyiv. The study did not include occupied cities; data were collected in September–October 2026.
Local governance models
In the sixth year without local elections, several governance models have formed in the studied cities:
1. Governance by an elected mayor.
2. Governance by the council secretary as acting mayor.
3. Parallel functioning of local self-government bodies (LSG) and a military administration (MA).
4. Parallel functioning of MA and LSG with the council secretary as acting mayor.
5. Exercise of LSG powers by the head of the MA.
6. Functioning of the MA in the absence of a mayor and a council secretary.
However, these models exist in different legal planes. The council secretary performing the mayor’s duties is a mechanism of local self-government provided for by law.
By contrast, the creation of a military administration introduces a separate mechanism of state governance, which in itself does not automatically terminate the exercise of powers by elected bodies. Transferring the powers of the mayor, the council, and its executive bodies to the head of the MA requires a separate decision by the Verkhovna Rada upon the president’s submission.
Despite the emergence of new models, in most of the studied cities mayors elected in 2020 still govern. Transformation is taking place in a smaller number of cities — but it is precisely there that one can see how the system works when power continues to change while direct electoral renewal is unavailable.
A telling example is Pivdennoukrainsk. After a city council session on 22 January 2026, the next session could only be opened on 3 July after several postponements. Vitaliy Kim, then head of the Mykolaiv OVA, cited internal quarrels and misunderstandings within the city council and the presence of a nuclear power plant as reasons for creating an MA. In December 2025 the mayor Valeriy Onufriyenko requested the introduction of a city military administration.
On 2 July the president signed a decree establishing the Pivdennoukrainsk city military administration, which came into force on 4 July. However, the city council did not cease working: a session took place on 3 July, before the decree came into effect, and subsequent sessions on 15 July and 10 September.
In September the head of the city military administration (CMA) Ivan Kukhta and mayor Valeriy Onufriyenko signed a joint order on interaction procedures. According to reports about its content, the document foresees, among other things, preliminary coordination with the CMA head of certain personnel decisions regarding municipal enterprises and institutions.
This case shows why the mere number of created MAs is not enough. First, the emergence of a military administration does not necessarily stop the work of elected bodies, but it can change the order of managerial decision-making and the actual distribution of powers. Second, among the publicly stated reasons for creating the MA in Pivdennoukrainsk were not only security risks related to the location of the nuclear power plant, but also conflicts within the city council. Therefore, it is important to clarify not only who actually governs the community and is accountable for decisions made, but also where the line runs between the necessity of ensuring governance during war and the interference of the state vertical in local political processes.
When the mayor is in power
Elected mayors continue to govern in 271 cities (80% of the total). Thus, despite six years without local elections, the basic model of city governance remains dominant: in 80% of the studied cities the heads directly elected by communities in 2020 still govern.
Although from the outside it may seem that everything remains “as before” in these cities, the conditions of mayors’ work have changed. Local self-government bodies are responsible for communities’ livelihoods during the full-scale war, while operating in the context of an enhanced state vertical. This creates both new coordination opportunities and risks of political pressure.
Almost a third of incumbent mayors are self-nominated — 85. Twice as few were elected from Servant of the People.
The party composition of mayors and acting secretaries differs noticeably. Among incumbent mayors the largest group are self-nominated. In contrast, among the secretaries who perform mayoral powers the most are representatives of Servant of the People. This does not prove a systemic takeover of cities by a particular party, but shows that, in the mayor’s absence, the party makeup of the council becomes more important because deputies elect the secretary, who, under the law, can assume the mayor’s powers. In the absence of elections, such a change can affect not only the personal composition of city leadership but also its party balance — without a new expression of the community’s will.
In 16 city councils mayors are present but secretaries are absent. The secretary is a potential acting mayor and city leader. The absence of a secretary can be temporary while the council convenes to vote for a new one. However, in some places this is a permanent state.
In Kharkiv the last secretary (the last one, because a new one has not yet appeared) was the incumbent mayor Ihor Terekhov. He held this position since December 2020, becoming acting mayor after the death of Hennadiy Kernes. After Terekhov’s election as mayor, Kharkiv has had no secretary for five years.
There is also no secretary in Kyiv, although the political situation in the capital is different from other cities. Since 2020 the position of deputy mayor — secretary of the Kyiv City Council was held by Volodymyr Bondarenko, who left the post in April 2025. At that time Bondarenko’s name appeared in an NABU case, which conducted a large-scale operation “Clean City” regarding land fraud by Denys Komarnytskyi.
Thus, in the largest group of cities personnel continuity is preserved: the city leadership remains with those directly elected. At the same time, in some councils the secretary’s post, which should ensure succession in case of early termination of the mayor’s powers, remains vacant. This creates an institutional vulnerability, but the reasons for such a situation can vary: from deputies’ inability to agree on a candidate to the mayor’s deliberate unwillingness to allow the emergence of an alternative center of influence in the council that could, under certain circumstances, assume his powers.
When the secretary is acting mayor
In 42 cities the council secretaries perform the mayor’s powers. This is no longer merely a short-term succession mechanism: in some communities it lasts for years. The secretary has his own elected mandate as a deputy, but the community did not elect him as mayor — the council appointed him to the secretary’s post. At the same time this mechanism preserves the representative basis of local self-government: the secretary is an elected deputy and performs mayoral powers according to the procedure provided by law. However, he does not have a direct mandate from the community specifically for the mayoral post.
The process continues in 2026 year. On 25 March deputies of the Lutsk city council supported the resignation of mayor Ihor Polishchuk; the secretary of the council also submitted a statement that day. The deputies elected Kateryna Shklyoda as the new secretary, who began performing the mayor’s duties. In July she was replaced in this position by Andriy Razumovskyi. That same month, the mayor of Vylkove Matvii Ivanov lost his position after a court verdict in a case of illegal sand extraction from the Danube came into force.
In six cities — Kryvyi Rih, Zolotonosha, Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi, Karlivka, Svaliava and Bobrovytsia — secretaries have been performing mayoral powers since 2021.
Thus, six cities have lived almost a full ordinary electoral cycle with a leader the community did not elect as mayor. A secretary can be changed by a council decision, while voters, until elections resume, cannot either confirm him as mayor or elect another.
Council secretary of Kryvyi Rih Yurii Vilkul has been performing mayoral powers for about five years. After the death of the elected mayor Kostiantyn Pavlov, the then council secretary resigned, and the council elected Vilkul as secretary.
For him this is a return to city management in a different status. Vilkul was mayor of Kryvyi Rih in 2010–2020, and in the 2020 elections he again ran but withdrew before the second round. Now he exercises mayoral powers not as a result of direct elections to that post, but through the succession mechanism.
Kryvyi Rih particularly clearly shows the political side of such a succession mechanism. Alongside Yurii Vilkul, his son Oleksandr Vilkul plays a significant role in city governance. As OPORA noted in a security audit of the Kryvyi Rih community in 2025, a city military administration was not created, but after the start of the full-scale invasion a Kryvyi Rih Defense Council was formed, headed by Oleksandr Vilkul. His status and powers provoked public and legal disputes.
Thus, in a city where voters have not been able to reelect authorities for almost six years, exercise of mayoral powers and a prominent role in wartime city management long remained associated with one political family. This raises broader questions about political competition and accountability of power during a prolonged absence of elections.
A third of secretaries acting as mayors are representatives of Servant of the People — 16. Deputies from For the Future govern six cities.
The succession mechanism allowed cities not to be left without leadership, but due to the absence of elections in some communities the temporary exercise of powers has become multi-year. As a result, a city can be governed for years by a deputy elected by the community but without a direct mandate from voters specifically for the mayoral office.
When a military administration is created
In 27 out of 340 studied cities military administrations were created — about 8%. Several governance models are represented here.
In 19 the heads of military administrations were transferred the powers of the mayor, the council, and its executive bodies. At the same time, in six of them the elected mayor headed the created military administration. Here his position fully depends on the central government, not the community, although there remains a connection with the population through his victory in local elections.
In eight cities elected bodies continue to operate in parallel with the MA. Thus, in five communities a military administration exists alongside the incumbent mayor — in Kyiv, Varash, Netishyn, Pivdennoukrainsk and Ternivka. Kyiv, due to its status, is a separate case that cannot be compared with other communities.
In two cities military administrations function alongside secretaries acting as mayors — in Sumy and Odesa.
And a separate case is Chernihiv, where there is no mayor or council secretary, yet the MA has not been granted the powers of the LSG.
Thus, the mere presence of an MA does not yet indicate how much the city governance model has changed.
The problem of temporary appointed governance did not arise after 2022. Even before the full-scale invasion, the experience of military-civil administrations (MCA) in Donetsk and Luhansk revealed risks of prolonged removal of communities from elected governance and concentration of powers in the hands of appointed leaders. Current military administrations have a different legal basis — the Law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” — but there is still no separate comprehensive law that would systematically regulate their work and interaction with local self-government. Under such conditions, transparency of the grounds for creating MAs, delineation of powers, control over budgetary and property decisions, and accountability to the community acquire special significance.
In Odesa both the MA and the city council operate simultaneously. After the decision to revoke Hennadiy Trukhanov’s citizenship in October 2025 he lost the mayoral post. His powers are exercised by the city council secretary Ihor Koval, and the MA head became Serhii Lysak, who previously led the Dnipropetrovsk OVA. There are no notable public conflicts between the MA and the city council so far. At the same time, local influence groups continue to coexist with the MA leadership after Trukhanov’s resignation.
Military administrations were also created in three cities adjacent to nuclear power plants: in 2023 — in Netishyn, in 2024 — in Varash, and in 2 July 2026 — in Pivdennoukrainsk. When establishing MAs in these cities, proximity to NPPs was cited, directly or indirectly, as a rationale. In such communities questions of critical infrastructure security and coordination between local self-government and military management gain particular importance.
However, personnel appointments in these cities do not always align with the security rationale. If in Netishyn the MA head was a former SBU officer, in Varash it was a deputy of the Rivne Regional Council who had no experience in the security sector. This raises the question of how decisive security competencies were in such appointments.
One cannot exclude that in appointing leaders considerations other than security were taken into account, including interests of various political or economic groups for whom influence over city management and its resources is important. At the same time, this does not absolve local self-government bodies themselves from questions, including about corruption risks in their activities. However, replacing electoral influence with appointed control does not by itself guarantee overcoming these risks and may merely redistribute control over resources among different interest groups.
In all these cases the MA exists alongside local self-government bodies. Such a construction does not necessarily generate conflict, but often raises questions about the division of powers and responsibilities between the two institutions.
Thus, the scale of change in local governance is determined not by the fact of creating an MA, but by what happened afterward to the elected bodies, who holds key powers, and who actually answers for decisions. The appearance of an MA creates another decision-making center in the community, whose powers depend on the management model established by law and on specific decisions about their transfer.
Chernihiv: when formal authority does not equal actual authority
One of the most striking examples of open conflict in which the city council lost part of its influence over governance as a result of political struggle is Chernihiv. There, in 2023 a city military administration was created, and the city has neither a mayor nor a secretary, although the council continues to operate. A secretary is not elected, and some mayoral functions are performed by one of his deputies.
Vladyslav Atroshenko, mayor since 2015 and a three-term member of parliament, in 2023 lost his post after a court decision on a violation of conflict-of-interest prevention requirements entered into force. The court fined him and deprived him for a year of the right to hold positions related to the exercise of local self-government functions. The basis was the use of an official driver to transport his wife’s private car abroad. Atroshenko called the case politically motivated and linked it to a confrontation with the central authorities.
The conflict did not end there. The secretary from the pro-mayor party Ridnyi Dim, Oleksandr Lomako, remained acting mayor until the end of 2024. In December he submitted his resignation as council secretary, citing military administrations, which, in his words, “took the city hostage.” Lomako also spoke of pressure from military administrations; representatives of the state vertical denied these accusations.
Since then the city has remained without a mayor or a council secretary. After Lomako’s resignation, the council authorized Deputy Mayor Viktor Herashchenko to perform functions related to the current activities of the city executive bodies.
The most visible manifestation of the shift in the balance between local self-government and the CMA was in budgetary powers. In 2024 courts, in a dispute between the military administration and the city council over amendments to the community’s budget for 2023, sided with the MA. The city council appealed those decisions to the Supreme Court.
On 28 May 2026 the Supreme Court left the council’s cassation appeal unsatisfied, confirming that after the MA’s creation the powers to draft, approve, and amend the local budget passed to the military administration.
Chernihiv illustrates that the real influence of the state vertical on community governance can increase even without a legislative transfer to the MA of the entire range of local self-government powers. The conflict was exacerbated, in particular, by differing interpretations by the parties of the division of powers between the MA and the local council.
Given that in some communities transferring powers to military administrations requires a Verkhovna Rada decision, political conflict between local self-government and the state vertical itself becomes a factor in changing the real balance of power. At the same time, Chernihiv so far does not suggest that such a scenario is inevitable for other cities: in the majority of communities where LSG and MAs operate in parallel, there is no open confrontation of such scale.
When the military administration got everything
In 19 cities the heads of military administrations exercise the powers of the city council, its executive bodies, and the mayor. This is the deepest institutional change in the sample: it is no longer about coexistence of the MA and local self-government, but about the exercise of key powers of elected bodies by the MA head.
Nine of 19 cities are located in Donetsk region, six in Kharkiv region, two in Kherson (including the city of Kherson), and one each in Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv regions.
However, this group is also heterogeneous. In six of 19 cities the MA heads became the mayors elected by the community in 2020. That is, the institutional model of governance changed, but personally the city continued to be governed by a person who had received a direct electoral mandate in 2020 — now as an appointed MA head. In other cases both the governance model and the leader changed — key powers went to an appointed person.
Important! Different pathways from elected to appointed governance will matter after the end of martial law: whether the elected mayor kept his powers and which decisions parliament made will determine the order of restoring the work of local self-government bodies.
Oleksandr Honcharenko became mayor of Kramatorsk as a result of the elections in 2020. In July 2022 a city military administration was established there, whose head was the incumbent mayor.
In Sloviansk the route was longer. Vadym Liakh was elected mayor twice — in 2015 and 2020. After the creation of the military-civil administration in 2021 he headed the MCA, and after the start of the full-scale invasion he headed the city military administration. Thus, the elected leader sequentially moved into new, already state forms of city governance.
Izium shows another dynamic. The first head of the military administration was the elected mayor Valeriy Marchenko. In 2025 he was replaced by Serhii Fedchenko, who earlier had been first deputy of the Boryvskyi settlement head. Formally the governance model did not change — the city is still governed by an MA. However, the MA leader changed: instead of the elected mayor, another appointed person headed it. At the same time Valeriy Marchenko remained mayor, but without real powers.
Kherson is an example of yet another personnel route. The city military administration was headed by officials from law enforcement and the state vertical: Yaroslave Shanko before appointment worked as deputy head of the Kherson OVA and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, his predecessor Roman Mrochko worked in the prosecutor’s office.
Thus, four cases show different trajectories within the same legal model: an elected mayor can himself move into the MA, go through an MCA, later be replaced as MA head by another appointed leader, or the MA leadership can pass to someone from the state or law enforcement vertical.
Kyiv: the elected mayor and new centers of power
Kyiv has always been a special prize in the rivalry between presidents and city mayors. The fight for control of the capital is a struggle not only for political influence but also for the budget, communal economy, and managerial resources of the country’s largest city. In 2010 Viktor Yanukovych appointed Oleksandr Popov head of the Kyiv City State Administration, effectively depriving the elected mayor Leonid Chernovetskyi of control over the city executive power. Today that old collision returns — already in wartime.
The current confrontation has another dimension: Vitali Klitschko heads the Association of Ukrainian Cities, which defends communities’ interests in relations with the central government. Therefore, the conflict around Kyiv’s governance goes beyond the capital and overlaps with a broader struggle for powers and resources of local self-government.
Kyiv’s particularity lies in the fact that the Kyiv City State Administration (KSCA) simultaneously performs the functions of the state administration and the executive body of the Kyiv City Council. It is headed by the elected mayor Vitali Klitschko. After the full-scale invasion, alongside the KSCA a Kyiv City Military Administration (KCMA) appeared, whose head is appointed by the president. Legislation did not provide a clear separation of powers between the two administrations. When KCMA was headed by Tymur Tkachenko, this repeatedly led to public conflicts over transport, shelters, and other city management issues.
After Tkachenko’s dismissal in July 2026 the KCMA remained without a permanent head. His duties are performed by the first deputy Andrii Tkachov. However, the absence of an appointed leader did not remove the main question: who controls the capital’s governance and to whom is it accountable.
Recently a new cause for confrontation has been Kyiv’s preparation for winter. President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly criticized its pace; Klitschko responded with data on completed works and funding. But responsibility is not so straightforward: local authorities are responsible for municipal infrastructure, while some energy resilience projects depend on the government and state structures. So the dispute over the capital’s readiness for winter simultaneously became a dispute about powers, resources, and political responsibility.
Against this backdrop Zelensky began consultations on strengthening Kyiv’s security, including meeting with former SBU head Vasyl Malyuk. And on 23 October the president spoke of creating a “special cabinet” to develop decisions regarding Kyiv, without explaining what this body would be, what decisions it would make, and how it would coexist with the KSCA, the KCMA and the Kyiv City Council. Already on 28 October Zelensky said he had offered to head the KCMA Volodymyr Groysman, Oleksandr Kubrakov and Serhii Sukhomlyn, but all three declined.
Here a fundamental question arises: can the conflict over powers be resolved by creating yet another center of power? Current legislation does not provide for a separate “cabinet” to govern the capital. If it is an advisory platform — that is one thing. If it is a structure that would assume management powers, its constitutionality would be questioned. An equally sensitive and possible scenario is replacing the head of the KCMA: the Constitutional Court’s decision of 25 December 2003 No.21-rp/2003 ties this position to the elected Kyiv mayor.
Thus, the war did not initiate the struggle over Kyiv, but gave it new instruments. The elected mayor remains in office, but control over the capital’s management has again become a subject of confrontation with the central authorities.
Instead of conclusions
Changes in the governance of Ukrainian cities are taking place against the backdrop of a strengthening state vertical. Since the start of the full-scale war, the center has not only obtained additional security powers but also redistributed some of the communities’ financial resources in its favor. In particular, since 2023 the personal income tax from the pay of servicemen and law enforcement has been directed to the state budget. Despite introduced compensation mechanisms, this has increased the local level’s dependence on central decisions regarding fund allocation.
Another factor has been active actions by law enforcement agencies, which some local self-government representatives called pressure. At the same time, investigations by the independent anti-corruption vertical NABU/SAP should be distinguished from the discussion about presidential influence on the law enforcement system. It is within this political and institutional context that the study’s results should be considered.
So:
First, the basic model of city governance remains resilient. Six years after local elections in 80% of the studied cities, elected mayors still govern. Thus, the data do not justify talking about the displacement of local self-government by the state vertical.
At the same time formal leadership shows only one side — the external one, behind which real influence may be hidden. In the conditions of a full-scale war central powers have expanded, and informal instruments of influence have been added.
Second, the local government system itself has noticeably changed over these six years. The number of cities without a sitting mayor has grown from seven in 2021 to 45 in 2026. In six cities secretaries have already almost completed a normal five-year mayoral cycle. The absence of elections did not freeze the power formed in 2020. The mechanism of local government renewal in wartime has changed, without the possibility of holding elections and direct community voting.
Third, military administrations have created several additional governance models — and here the most noticeable risks of changing the balance between local self-government and the state vertical appear. In some cities MAs operate alongside elected bodies; in others their heads exercise the powers of the mayor, council and executive committee. At the same time, in some cities MA heads have become mayors elected in 2020. Chernihiv shows the other side of this construction: the actual balance of influence can change even without formally transferring the entire range of LSG powers to the MA.
Moreover, creating MAs can be related not only to security needs but also to political conflicts within communities. The war did not eliminate political competition for resources, powers and influence, and personnel appointments and decisions on power transfers affect who actually controls city governance today and what the conditions will be for restoring elected power after the war. Additional uncertainty is created by the question of delineation of powers between local self-government bodies and military administrations.
Fourth, these changes occur at a moment when the role of cities in the country’s resilience is only growing. Constant Russian attacks on cities and critical infrastructure increase the responsibility of local authorities for heat, transport, shelters, communal services and recovery. Therefore, the ability of central and local authorities to work together, distribute powers, resources and responsibility becomes a question not only of democracy but of the country’s resilience. How well this interaction functions today is a separate question that this study did not measure.
After the war it will be necessary to return to the issue of effective state supervision over the legality of local self-government acts — in particular to problems that the initial draft law No.4298 tried to solve. Numerous control bodies do not guarantee legality of decisions, especially where informal arrangements have developed between local authorities and representatives of law enforcement and oversight systems. Without a supervision mechanism independent of local interests but protected from political misuse by the center, decentralization will remain institutionally unfinished.
Thus, the main risk these data show is not the disappearance of local self-government, but the gradual change of the power structure itself. Temporary leaders remain for years, MAs operate alongside or instead of elected bodies, and some resources and powers shift to the state level. Not only the composition of local authorities changes, but also their degree of autonomy and the mechanisms for leadership change.
The war requires centralized coordination, but the political struggle for control over cities and their resources continues. And the longer the electoral renewal mechanism is inactive, the sharper the questions become about the future of local self-government and the return to democratic procedures after the war. Above all — the question this study began with: who actually governs the city, to whom is he accountable, and how can the community influence that authority.
How we calculated
In total, 24 regions contain 1469 communities, of which 411 are urban (the community center is located in a city). The city of Kyiv has a special status. The selection criterion was the exercise of powers on the territory of the community. Temporarily occupied communities were excluded from the sample, although their local self-government bodies may continue to operate.
As a result, we analyzed 339 city communities of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv. Thus, the sample size was 340 units.
The sample also included communities where the powers of local self-government bodies are exercised by a military administration. We separately distinguished city communities where the MA operates alongside local self-government bodies and cities where the MA head exercises the powers of the city council, its executive bodies and the mayor.
We collected data on mayors and council secretaries, the actual exercise of mayoral powers, the presence and powers of the military administration, and the MA leaders. Primary data collection was carried out in September–October 2026.
The data sources were official websites of communities and military administrations. For clarification we also used the Unified State Register of Declarations.
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